Kazakhstan remains heavily reliant on oil exports through the pipeline of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), which passes through southern Russia. This cooperation benefits Kazakhstan economically but, by tying Kazakhstan further into Russian energy networks, it further complicates Astana’s efforts to balance relations with Moscow and Western powers.
Russian President Vladimir Putin attends a signing ceremony following Russia-Kazakhstan talks in Astana, Kazakhstan November 27, 2024. REUTERS/Turar Kazangapov
On November 27, 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s state visit to Kazakhstan underscored the complex geopolitical and security challenges facing the region. Hosted by Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in Astana, the visit took place amidst heightened tensions following Russia’s deployment of its Oreshnik hypersonic missile in Ukraine on November 21. This escalation has reshaped the regional security environment, compelling Kazakhstan to confront potential spillover effects of the Ukraine conflict, The Caspian Post reports citing The Times of Central Asia.
Energy remained a central focus during the visit. Kazakhstan remains heavily reliant on oil exports through the pipeline of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), which passes through southern Russia. This cooperation benefits Kazakhstan economically but, by tying Kazakhstan further into Russian energy networks, it further complicates Astana’s efforts to balance relations with Moscow and Western powers.
Following periodic closures of the CPC route on various pretexts, Kazakhstan has resolved to diversify its energy export strategy. It has increased shipments by barge across the Caspian Sea to enter the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, which terminates on Turkey’s coast in the eastern Mediterranean. One should not be surprised if ideas about the old Trans-Caspian Oil Pipeline (TCOP) project are taken out of deep storage for reanimation.
The TCOP is an undersea link first discussed in the late 2000s between then-Presidents Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan and Nicolas Sarkozy of France. It was shelved at the time because it did not seem geoeconomically necessary. Since then, relations between Russia and Kazakhstan have been complicated by the periodic CPC closures that, although they are given technical justification, appear politically motivated by Moscow to squeeze Astana.
Kazakhstan’s short-term solution, to increase oil shipments by barge across the Caspian Sea to Baku for insertion into the BTC pipeline, simply cannot attain the volumes necessary to provide a strategic alternative to the CPC. The BTC, at present, would be able to accommodate whatever volumes Kazakhstan would be able to transit to Azerbaijan including via a prospective TCOP, for export to world markets from Ceyhan.
One would suppose that bilateral discussions also covered the possible participation of Rosatom in the construction and operation of Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant (NPP). However, no mention of this topic was made in public statements. Kazakhstan would prefer to escape the vise-like pressure between Russia and China on this matter. That is why Tokayev has discussed participation by the French firms Orano and EDF with France’s President Emmanuel Macron.
It has recently been suggested that it would be technically feasible for Kazakhstan to find a group of Western companies capable of executing the project. A Western consortium would have no reason to hesitate to include Kazatomprom in an appropriate role, not excluding capacity-building. The Russia-only and China-only options for the NPP’s construction would be less welcoming to such a possibility. Kazakhstan’s leadership has become properly sensitive to how energy partnerships are not just economic decisions, but strategic calculations in Central Asia’s volatile geopolitical landscape.
Indeed, Russia’s use of the Oreshnik missile against Ukraine has created an entirely new security situation. It has raised concerns that the military conflict may worsen, and Putin’s visit came days after that escalation. Tokayev has responded to Russia’s deployment of the Oreshnik by instructing Kazakhstan’s government to enhance security measures, prioritizing critical infrastructure and border regions near Russian military facilities. Kazakhstan needs to strengthen its air and missile defenses to mitigate risks of accidental strikes or provocations.
A nuclear conflict remains unlikely, but Kazakhstan must prepare for worst-case scenarios, including unintended strikes near its territory. Kazakhstan’s proximity to Russia’s military bases creates risks that call for improved civil defense and radiation preparedness. The sensitivity of the situation for Kazakhstan is only increased by its position as a non-aligned state that refused to recognize the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics. It is imperative for Kazakhstan to diminish its dependence on Russian economic and security ties in order to maintain and enhance its own sovereignty.
Putin’s visit also served as a platform for reinforcing Russia’s influence in Central Asia. Facing Western sanctions and growing isolation over its actions in Ukraine, Russia has sought to solidify alliances with regional partners. Kazakhstan, as Central Asia’s largest economy and a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), remains vital to Moscow’s strategy. The CSTO summit, held alongside Putin’s visit, emphasized the bloc’s role in Russia’s search to impose its own version of regional stability.
During the visit, both leaders emphasized the importance of stable economic ties and made commitments to accelerate the development of international transport corridors linking Central and South Asia. These projects highlight Kazakhstan’s strategic role in Russia’s efforts to pivot away from European markets.
Whether this new phenomenon gives Kazakhstan actual economic leverage over Russia is open to discussion. Economic relations between the two countries remain a cornerstone of their partnership, but recent trade disputes have tested their resilience. Russia’s ban on Kazakhstan’s agricultural exports and Kazakhstan’s decision not to join BRICS illustrate these tensions.
Putin’s visit highlighted Russia’s determination to maintain influence in Central Asia, but it also exposed the limitations of Moscow’s approach in a region increasingly seeking to diversify its partnerships. Against the backdrop of Russia’s military escalation in Ukraine and growing regional instability, Kazakhstan faces mounting pressures to safeguard its interests while navigating the challenges of an increasingly polarized world.
Kazakhstan’s diplomacy remains pragmatic, engaging Russia while pursuing ties with other global powers. As international tensions intensify, Kazakhstan’s ability to maintain this balance will be crucial for its security and sovereignty. Its response — enhancing its defenses, diversifying its economic partnerships, and asserting its diplomatic independence — will determine not just how its relationship with Russia will develop, but also its own role in shaping the evolving dynamics of Central Asia.
