Relations between Russia and the Central Asian states are a special phenomenon in modern international politics: they are the a product of the interaction of several unique factors that do not require evidence at the conceptual level. This is not because they share a common heritage, dating back to their joint development as parts of a single state.
The most important of these factors are of a more fundamental nature, The Caspian Post reports citing foreign media.
First, we are talking about a genuine community of geographical space. Second, there is no likelihood, not even a hypothetical one, that our neighbours in the region will pose a threat to Russia at the level of their state policies. Therefore, our relations extend beyond normal international politics, which, according to the classic definition of Raymond Aron, "develops in the shadow of war." These two axioms now form a solid foundation for relations, and against their background, we are able to observe everything else. We are even able to look act activity which may have serious tactical significance, but nevertheless remains secondary to the overall strategic assessment of the situation. First of all, because we inevitably consider all other issues of relations between Russia and the states of the region through the prism of common geography and the absence of a military threat.
In part, this makes our relations simpler; it helps us establish a stable framework for relations and gives us confidence that they will develop without leading to exceptionally undesirable outcomes. Russia and the Central Asian countries are confident that in the future, they will be able to find solutions to current problems in conditions where the creation of dividing barriers between them is impossible. They also firmly proceed from the fact that the relations are fundamentally friendly and aren’t characterised by mutual restraint, which forces international policy in all other cases to be based on fear. It should be noted that, first of all, such an approach is decisive for Russia, which, apparently, sees Central Asia as a region where it is impossible, even theoretically, to imagine the emergence of a state or alliance of states that make anti-Russian actions central to their foreign policy strategy. Moreover, due to its geopolitical position, there are no fears that Central Asia will be used for the deployment of significant forces and resources by powers which are hostile toward Russia's security interests. It is for that reason that even in the second half of the 19th century, contradictions and tactical misunderstandings between Russia and Great Britain did not seriously affect the general nature of relations between these European empires.
At the same time, observers have expressed concerns that such a degree of confidence in the unshakable nature of neighbourliness may lead to the temptation not to consider current challenges and problems of a tactical nature seriously. It may also provoke disdain for those phenomena that could potentially have a destructive effect on mutual trust. In particular, experts from Russia and the Central Asian countries have expressed concerns about the mutual spread of negative rhetoric in the media. These manifestations, of course, do not carry the threat of serious mutual rejection or, worse, hostility. However, in combination with other factors, they may become one of the obstacles to cooperation in the future where it is really necessary. We must not forget about the activities of those forces for whom destabilisation in Central Asia is a potentially important tool for diplomatic interaction not only with Russia, but also with China. We cannot predict with certainty the course of Chinese-American rivalry in the future. The active Chinese presence in Central Asia, which already brings visible benefits to its economies, can only provoke such negative intrusions.
Needless to say, confidence in the future, based on objective factors, has limited dialogue and cooperation in those areas where it would be good for us to find joint solutions regarding emerging problems right now; to create shared approaches to assessing how the evolution of the statehood of Russia and the Central Asian countries affects their ability to ensure that sustainable cooperation grows on the solid foundation of our relations. This is what our common neighbours in China, Iran and Afghanistan expect from Russia and Central Asia, as well as the other major powers of Eurasia, such as, for example, India.
Now, when cooperation between Russia and the Central Asian countries is reaching a new level, it seems important to pay attention to several issues that will arise in the near future. First, this means managing the risks associated with the objective processes of social development. These processes, as well as the domestic political events associated with them, are the result of our countries' movement along the path of consolidation of statehood and its development in a changing international environment. They also reflect internal transformations that inevitably arise as a response to external challenges, social and economic changes, a change in generations of statesmen, and much more. It is no secret, for example, that in the Central Asian countries, the processes of modernisation, economic openness, as well as the expansion of international cooperation in science and education are accompanied by a certain archaisation of the social structure. In part, this archaisation is a response to the challenges and temptations of the outside world, but it also becomes an inevitable consequence of moving along the path of independent adoption of domestic and foreign policy decisions. In fact, almost no one is free from this now, and Russia, of course, is no exception. Moreover, it has been building its own multinational and multireligious statehood on an unusual republican basis for several decades. We also see manifestations of archaisation in Russian society itself, which, according to experts, is becoming a reaction to the challenges and concerns of the modern world, as well as the objective efforts of the state to create a more solid social foundation for itself.
The problem of religious radicalism and extremism is directly related to the archaisation of the social structure, common to Russia and the Central Asian countries. Moreover, this happens in conditions where the increasingly active inclusion in the global economy increases the risks that significant masses of the population will be impoverished. In Central Asia, these processes can be aggravated by the objective problems of climate change, water shortages and energy stress. The states of the region, of course, are in a privileged geographical position to experience serious concerns about the trans-border manifestations of this challenge: they do not border Turkey, Israel and are sufficiently distant from the monarchies of the Persian Gulf. None of the neighbours of the Central Asian countries seriously considers their territories as a base for the deployment of subversive activities in their geopolitical interests. However, it cannot be completely ruled out that hotbeds of extremism may arise inside the countries of the region, the manifestations of which can potentially lead to destabilization, especially if certain socio-economic prerequisites arise. For Russia, this challenge is all the more urgent because we are now faced with manifestations of religious extremism in the North Caucasus, which is located quite close to Central Asia. Therefore, mutual trust and the comprehensive discussion of such issues will remain an important area of our cooperation in the future.
Undoubtedly, one of the most important issues is that of managing labour migration, which closely links Russia and Central Asia, but is becoming, in practical aspects, the subject of certain differences in opinion. The significance of this issue is determined by at least three aspects. First, we are talking about the gradual formation in Russia of a system for managing a phenomenon that represents a certain challenge for all societies that, due to objective reasons, are faced with the need to attract labour resources from abroad. We are closely following the experience of European countries and the USA, where migration issues have become one of the central factors of domestic political life in recent years, and, of course, we would like to avoid this. Second, for three of the five Central Asian states (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan), labour migration in the foreseeable future will remain one of the most important tools for managing significant demographic growth and the simultaneous deterioration of living conditions due to climate change and the water problem. We cannot expect investments in the manufacturing sector to be so significant that they reduce the outflow of labour, or that other countries will be able to accept significantly more migrants. Finally, the civilized management of this issue at the bilateral or even multilateral level will allow us to solve an important political task: to form relations between Russia and the Central Asian countries that are qualitatively different from those that exist between Europe and its former colonies, or the United States and the Latin American countries which are dependent on their northern neighbour.
A joint address to these important topics linking Russia and the Central Asian countries is necessary in the general Eurasian context. This also creates several questions for the future, attention to which seems to be useful for the implementation of the interests of Russia and its neighbours in the region, both in the field of security and in achieving the most important national development goals.
First, to what extent can the interaction of Russia and the Central Asian countries contribute to the security of Greater Eurasia, in terms of freedom from the likelihood of external destabilising influence? Second, what can be the contribution of our friendly neighbours - China and Iran - do to increase stability and dynamic development in the centre of Eurasia? And finally, can cooperation between Russia and the Central Asian countries already now serve as the framework for a common regional security system that will not be directed against other regions? Can it be truly open, but capable of effectively solving our current problems? The search for answers to these questions, which are much more important than many current discussions, will hopefully serve as the foundation for intellectual and political interaction between good neighbours.
