As the door to Europe remains frustratingly ajar, Georgia is shifting its gaze eastward, investing heavily in the potential of the Middle Corridor to secure its geopolitical and economic future. This emerging transit route-spanning from China to Europe via Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, and the South Caucasus-has quickly evolved from a distant aspiration to a strategic imperative for Tbilisi. By anchoring itself as a vital link in this trade and logistics chain, Georgia seeks to capitalize on its geographic position to facilitate the flow of goods between Asia and Europe. Recent diplomatic and economic engagements with Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and other Central Asian nations underscore a clear ambition: to transform Georgia into an indispensable node of Eurasian connectivity.
The expansion of port infrastructure at Poti and Batumi, enhancements in railway capabilities, and streamlined customs procedures all point to a broader vision of positioning Georgia as a key transit hub. Significant investments in the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, which links the Caspian region to Europe, illustrate a commitment to this vision. The government’s recent agreements on transit fees and protocols with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan further reinforce the perception that Georgia’s leaders see the Middle Corridor as a pragmatic alternative to the increasingly unstable Northern Corridor through Russia. The war in Ukraine has made this pivot not only timely but essential for Georgia's strategic autonomy.
Georgian section of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway/Photo credit: caspiannews.com
However, this shift is not merely about logistics-it reflects a deeper recalibration of Georgia's foreign policy. The single-minded pursuit of European Union membership now appears increasingly like a strategic miscalculation. Years of waiting for Brussels to advance Georgia’s integration have yielded little, forcing Tbilisi to rethink its priorities. The European Union's reluctance to provide a clear timeline for accession, coupled with the domestic political crisis and criticisms of democratic backsliding, have further strained relations. In response, the ruling Georgian Dream party has embraced a more balanced foreign policy, seeking to offset Western skepticism with stronger ties to its eastern neighbors.
This pragmatic pivot also reflects a sober assessment of geopolitical realities. With EU accession remaining a distant dream, Georgia's leadership seems to have embraced a multi-vector foreign policy-one that balances aspirations for Western integration with practical partnerships in the East. In this context, closer cooperation with Azerbaijan and Armenia takes on added significance. Enhanced regional ties could serve as a counterbalance to the influence of external powers while laying the groundwork for long-term stability and economic growth in the South Caucasus.
The energy dimension is a crucial part of this strategy. Georgia's role in the Southern Gas Corridor, which transports Caspian gas to Europe, already underscores its importance as an energy transit country. Expanding this role through new pipeline projects and increased cooperation with Azerbaijan could enhance Georgia's strategic leverage. Additionally, discussions on renewable energy projects with Central Asian nations highlight Tbilisi's desire to diversify its energy partnerships. Such moves are also a hedge against potential Russian pressure, demonstrating Georgia's intent to reduce its vulnerability to energy blackmail.
Yet, the path forward is not without obstacles. Unified regulations, infrastructure bottlenecks, and potential geopolitical tensions pose substantial risks. The success of the Middle Corridor hinges on the ability to navigate these challenges with a mix of diplomacy and pragmatism-particularly in maintaining constructive relations with Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, whose support is critical. The potential for conflicts of interest among the corridor's stakeholders cannot be dismissed. For instance, balancing relations with Türkiye -an enthusiastic proponent of the Middle Corridor-and Iran, which seeks to promote its own transit routes, will require deft diplomacy.
Critics may argue that Georgia's eastward pivot reflects a retreat from Western values, but such interpretations miss the point. Rather than turning away from the West, Tbilisi is adapting to a landscape where over-reliance on European aspirations has proven ineffective. By positioning itself as a strategic bridge between East and West, Georgia is not only safeguarding its sovereignty but also enhancing its appeal as a partner to both sides. This nuanced approach is a far cry from the binary East-or-West narrative that has dominated discussions about Georgia's foreign policy. It is, instead, a recognition that in an increasingly multipolar world, flexibility is a strategic asset.
Moreover, the domestic political implications of this pivot cannot be overlooked. By focusing on tangible economic benefits-such as job creation through infrastructure projects and increased revenue from transit fees-the government is also addressing the socioeconomic discontent that has fueled opposition protests in recent years. Public support for EU integration remains high, but as economic hardships persist, a strategy that delivers visible results could gradually shift public opinion towards a more Eurasian-oriented pragmatism.
The risks, however, are significant. A misstep in balancing relations with powerful neighbors like Russia and Türkiye could leave Georgia dangerously exposed. Russia's influence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia remains a potent threat, and any perception that Georgia is moving too far from Western influence could provoke a response from Moscow. Additionally, the United States’ recent warnings about Georgia's growing ties with China add another layer of complexity. For Tbilisi, the challenge is to expand its eastern partnerships without triggering punitive actions from the West or escalating tensions with Russia.
In essence, Georgia’s evolving foreign policy represents a calculated gamble-a bet that broadening its diplomatic and economic horizons will yield greater dividends than waiting indefinitely for EU membership. If successful, this strategy could redefine Georgia’s role on the Eurasian chessboard-not as a peripheral player yearning for Western approval, but as a pivotal transit hub capable of shaping regional dynamics on its own terms.
Georgia's challenge now is clear: to balance these new alliances without alienating its Western partners. How Tbilisi navigates this tightrope will determine whether its eastward pivot becomes a masterstroke of geopolitical strategy or a perilous miscalculation.
