Although geopolitical competition in Central Asia continues to be dominated by China, the United States, Saudi Arabia, and others, Brussels is steadily establishing itself as a credible long-term partner in the region.
Central Asia, comprising Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan, is once again at the center of the geopolitical chessboard. The region’s vast reserves of oil and gas-nearly 3 percent of global proven oil reserves and over 12 percent of natural gas-have historically shaped its external engagements, The Caspian Post reports citing foreign media.
However, its real strategic value for the European Union today lies in its untapped renewable energy potential and its growing supply of critical raw materials (CRMs). The region currently produces 19 of the 34 CRMs the EU needs, including lithium, cobalt, and nickel, with plans to expand this number to 21. In the long run, this could potentially help counterbalance China’s dominance in the global CRM market. Moreover, thanks to its favorable geographic and climatic conditions, the region is endowed with an immense, untapped renewable energy potential, particularly in solar, wind, and hydropower, which are often regarded as the lifeblood of the future global economy.
Central Asia’s Role in the EU’s Evolving Strategic Calculus
The EU, which hosted the first-ever EU-Central Asia summist in Brussels this April, is the region’s second-largest trading partner and its largest foreign investor, accounting for more than 40 percent of total foreign direct investment (FDI) in the region. Over the past decade, EU exports to the region rose by 99.5 percent while imports grew by 42.6 percent. In 2023, trade between the EU and Central Asia reached €59 billion.
However, this impressive growth is not solely the result of strategic and commercial alignment. A more nuanced analysis indicates that part of the surge in trade is likely linked to the circumvention of sanctions imposed on Russia. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) findings suggest that around 30 percent of EU exports to Central Asia involving sanctioned goods may be rerouted through Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, pointing to potential in sanctions evasion networks. Complementing these findings, Germany’s ifo institute reports that since March 2022, Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries, including those in Central Asia, have supplied 8 percent of Russia’s military-related imports and 3 percent of its economically critical goods.
In a way, this only underlines Central Asia’s rising strategic relevance. In this context, the EU’s Global Gateway initiative seeks to unlock the region’s vast potential in renewable energy and green hydrogen, secure access to CRMs, and support Central Asia’s efforts to reduce dependency on China.
The development of the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor (Middle Corridor) and the expansion of green energy infrastructure lie at the heart of this agenda. Being a strategic pillar of the EU’s external engagement, it serves as a multimodal trade and energy link between Central Asia and Europe via the South Caucasus and the Black Sea. It holds the potential to halve transport times and triple trade volumes by 2030. Beyond logistics, it is envisioned as a conduit for energy exports and fostering mutual economic and environmental benefits.
These strategic ambitions gained further momentum with the first EU-Central Asia Summit, held in April 2025 in Samarkand, Uzbekistan’s capital and a historic Silk Road hub. The summit marked a strategic milestone, opening a new chapter in relations and elevating the partnership to a more comprehensive and forward-looking level.
Building on this momentum, the EU announced a €12 billion Global Gateway investment package, in addition to the €10 billion already allocated for its flagship, the Middle Corridor. The new funding includes €3 billion for the Middle Corridor, €2.5 billion for CRMs, €6.4 billion for the green transition, and targeted support for renewable energy development across the region.
On the ground, European industry is increasingly active in Central Asia’s green transition. Notably, €1.6 billionhas been committed to Uzbekistan’s Almalyk copper mine, while Germany’s Svevind is advancing a large-scale green hydrogen project in Kazakhstan. In Uzbekistan, the EBRD is supporting a renewable hydrogen facility in partnership with ACWA Power and Uzkimyosanoat.
Positioning the EU Amid Evolving Regional Dynamics
While the EU is stepping up its engagement, it operates in a crowded and competitive environment. Other major players are also deepening their footprints in Central Asia’s energy landscape, each pursuing distinct strategic and economic interests.
China remains deeply embedded in the region via the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), having invested more than $105 billion in Central Asia over the past two decades. Beijing is also shifting from fossil fuels to renewables and equity stakes in strategic sectors.
Saudi Arabia, through ACWA Power, has committed $15 billion to Uzbekistan (its second largest investment after those made in the kingdom itself), with 87 percent of it targeting wind, green hydrogen, and solar projects.
While the United States is only moderately engaged in the renewable energy sector (and likely to be even less so under the second Trump administration), it supports electricity exports through initiatives like CASA-1000 and promotes trade links via the Lapis Lazuli Corridor to strengthen Afghan and Central Asian trade with Europe and the broader Eurasian region.
Although traditionally strong in the fossil fuel sector, Russia’s influence in Central Asia has been gradually declining since its invasion of Ukraine, particularly as it lacks the green energy capacity to compete with the Gulf States’ targeted investments and China’s expanding presence in the region.
Turkey is also gaining a stronger foothold in the region, though its investment in renewables remains modest, focused more on policy dialogue and trade facilitation rather than infrastructure projects.
Acknowledging their growing geopolitical significance, the Central Asian states are increasingly asserting strategic autonomy through multi-vector diplomacy and frameworks such as the C5+1 format. By carefully balancing relations with Russia, China, the EU, and other major political actors, the Central Asian countries are seeking to safeguard their national sovereignty, promote economic development, and elevate their international standing.
Opportunities and Challenges for Enhanced EU Engagement
The Central Asian region presents significant opportunities for deeper cooperation with the EU. As part of their commitment to the green transition, Central Asian states have set increasingly ambitious renewable energy targets.
Kazakhstan aims to generate 15 percent of its electricity from renewables by 2030, increasing to 50 percent by 2050. Meanwhile, Uzbekistan has raised its 2030 renewables target from 40 percent to 50 percent of total energy consumption. Tajikistan, already sourcing 98 percent of its electricity from hydropower, is now investing in solar and wind to diversify its energy mix and enhance energy security. Kyrgyzstan is also expanding its renewable portfolio beyond hydropower. Green hydrogen pilot projects are underway in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, with Tajikistan targeting production of one million tons by 2040.
The EU’s value proposition in Central Asia is grounded in its commitment to sustainable development, transparent governance, and long-term capacity building. Yet, translating these principles into effective engagement on the ground presents a series of challenges. Infrastructure gaps, particularly in transnational electricity grids, continue to hinder regional integration. At the same time, the EU faces intense financial competition, as Gulf States and China often provide faster, less conditional capital. The region’s varying legal, regulatory, and institutional frameworks further complicate project implementation. Achieving real impact will require targeted investments in upgrading grid infrastructure and concerted efforts to harmonize regulatory environments to enable cross-border energy trade.
Advancing Long-Term Strategic Partnerships
The EU’s push for renewable energy cooperation in the region is not just climate policy-it is rather a strategic investment in geopolitical relevance through sustainability. If Brussels delivers on its promises, sets itself apart from extractive models, and institutionalizes energy partnerships, it can become the region’s preferred partner in its green transition.
Germany’s leadership, grounded in industrial and renewable expertise, will be vital. In a world shaped by climate urgency and competitive connectivity, the EU’s mix of investment, credibility, and ambition may be its strongest asset.
Importantly, the EU should avoid viewing regional actors such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey as competitors. Instead, it should pursue strategic collaboration. Saudi Arabia, through ACWA Power, contributes significant financial resources and positions itself as a pragmatic middle power that does not threaten the EU’s potential growth in the region. Turkey, with its cultural affinity, regional ties, and expanding role in advancing the Middle Corridor, represents a valuable ally in promoting both connectivity and sustainable development in the region.
In light of China’s entrenched presence mainly through debt-trap diplomacy in the region, the Central Asian states are becoming increasingly cautious about the risks of overdependence. They are actively seeking to diversify their trade partnerships. The EU can play a vital role in supporting this trajectory by enabling access to global markets beyond China and Russia, thereby fostering a more balanced and mutually beneficial external environment.
Moreover, Central Asian governments are particularly receptive to cooperation in areas where the EU holds clear comparative advantage, renewable energy, critical raw materials, and the development of resilient transport corridors such as the Middle Corridor. If Brussels can deliver tangible outcomes in these domains, its presence in the region will not only be economically impactful but also diplomatically and strategically enduring, particularly in the context of the Green Transition.
Alignment with Core Objectives
Amid shifting global power dynamics, Central Asia is emerging as a strategic nexus in the EU’s evolving external policy, where imperatives of clean energy transition, supply chain resilience, and geopolitical autonomy intersect. Abundant with vast reserves of CRMs, immense renewable energy potential, and a strategic location along such routes as the Middle Corridor, the region offers more than economic opportunity-it presents a pathway to enhanced resilience and geopolitical autonomy.
From a strategic standpoint, deeper engagement with Central Asia aligns closely with the EU’s core objectives: accelerating the Green Transition, reducing reliance on Russian and Chinese supply chains, and promoting transparent, rules-based connectivity across Eurasia. This emerging partnership thus transcends the bounds of economic cooperation. Rather, it constitutes a long-term geopolitical investment in sustainability, regional stability, and the EU’s influence within an evolving multipolar international order.
Realizing these objectives will require the EU to institutionalize its engagement in Central Asia, most notably through the Global Gateway framework, to ensure that normative aspirations are effectively operationalized into lasting, mutually beneficial partnerships. Central Asia is well-positioned to become a strategic pillar of Europe’s evolving green and geopolitical architecture.
