The official visits of Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan on May 30, 2025, along with the first Central Asia-Italy Summit held in Astana, mark significant milestones reflecting Rome's strategic shift toward Eurasian geopolitics.
Central Asia, where global power competition intensified after the Ukraine war, has become an attractive region for Italy, both for energy and transport lines and for alternative expansions to the China-Russia axis, The Caspian Post reports citing foreign media.
The summit, which was held in this new format, reveals that Italy has developed a more original, multifaceted and pragmatic geopolitical vision, departing from its classical EU-centered foreign policy.
Rome's liabilities, opportunities
Italy's Central Asia policy is based on Rome's strategic response to global geopolitical fluctuations. In this context, three main imperatives stand out: Diversifying energy supply security, strengthening Europe-centered alternative corridors to the Belt and Road Initiative, and becoming an economic and logistical hub on the Mediterranean-Central Asia axis.
Energy supply security is critical for a large energy-importing country like Italy. The shocks experienced in the supply of natural gas after the Russian-Ukrainian war have led Rome to look for alternative energy sources. Central Asian countries are strategic partners in this context, with both their traditional energy resources and renewable energy potential. The calls for cooperation in the fields of hydro, solar and wind energy and technology transfers for energy efficiency, which came to the fore at the summit, support Italy's goals in this field.
Secondly, in line with the Global Gateway strategy developed by the European Union to counter China's Belt and Road Initiative, Italy aims to play a role in developing Eurasian land bridges. In this framework, the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) is considered an important corridor for both Italy and the EU to balance Chinese influence. Rome's financial and technical support for this project opens a new market for its logistics and infrastructure companies, while offering Central Asian countries alternative transit partnerships outside Russia and China.
Thirdly, Italy is adopting a strategy of becoming a logistics bridge on the Mediterranean-Central Asia route. Italian ports, especially centers such as Trieste, Genoa and Naples, can be positioned as important logistics gateways for the distribution of goods from Central Asia to Europe and Africa. In this context, Rome seeks to transform its geographical location into the status of a logistics centre. Considering the landlocked nature of Central Asia, railway and road lines connected to the Mediterranean create a great attraction for the countries of the region.
Italy's expanding interest is not only economic, but also diplomatic and cultural. In Central Asia, Rome presents an image of being free of historical baggage, ideologically neutral and non-interventionist. This distinguishes it from other European countries with a more active interventionist past and allows it to build relations of mutual trust with the countries of the region.
Moreover, cultural diplomacy, another important tool of Italian foreign policy, and opportunities for academic and technical cooperation in Central Asia, pave the way for "soft power" building. Joint programs between Italian universities and higher education institutions in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan promise long-term gains in areas such as technology transfer, establishment of research centers and student exchange programs. Such academic networks not only enhance educational capacity but also contribute to the adoption of European values among local elites.
Structural limits, strategic fragilities
Although the Astana summit of 2025 resulted in a comprehensive political declaration reaffirming the vision of multilateral cooperation between Italy and Central Asian countries, serious structural constraints and geopolitical vulnerabilities remain in the implementation of this vision. The goals of energy transformation, infrastructure connectivity, water security and economic integration outlined in the text of the declaration are at risk of conflict with the realistic balance of power and security conditions in the region.
The landlocked nature of Central Asia is one of the main obstacles to integration into international markets. The lack of direct access to the seas makes the region's trade routes dependent on actors with high political and security risks. The southern corridor to the Indian Ocean via Afghanistan is unstable due to the ISKP threat and security gaps. The use of Iran's strategic ports is severely constrained by Western sanctions, a diplomatic handicap for EU member states such as Italy. Pakistan's port infrastructure offers a theoretical alternative, but the country's internal political turbulence and separatist movements in Balochistan make this route fragile.
The security dimension is also important in Rome's efforts to increase its influence in the region. Although the declaration calls for cooperation in areas such as counterterrorism, border security and the fight against organized crime, Italy's limited capacity in these areas is noteworthy. Although NATO membership provides Rome with a diplomatic platform, it is impossible to talk about a security architecture in which it can be active in the field and intervene on its own. It can only be effective in the security sector through technical cooperation and capacity-building programmes within the EU framework.
Nevertheless, the areas highlighted in the declaration, such as energy, water and environment, are the main sectors where Italy can make a constructive contribution. On environmental agendas such as the Aral Lake crisis and the protection of mountainous ecosystems, Italian environmental technologies and sustainability-oriented development models can offer viable solutions for the region. Italian investments and technical expertise in renewable energy can support green transformation objectives. In addition, knowledge sharing, education and research networking are among the levers to consolidate Rome's soft power.
In the favorable scenario envisaged, Italy could become a reliable connection between Central Asia, Europe and the Mediterranean. This would strengthen Rome's role as a logistics hub and position it as an important partner in the region's quest to balance its dependence on Russia and China. On the contrary, Italy's investment and connectivity initiatives could be hampered if China's economic influence grows, Russia consolidates its influence in the region or border disputes re-escalate. Moreover, individual moves within the EU against the common foreign policy line could undermine Rome's prestige in the region and create strategic dissonance in relations with Brussels.
