In a strategic attempt to counter Beijing and Moscow, the EU has ramped up engagement with Central Asia, channeling massive investments in connectivity, critical, and rare earth minerals.
Amid shifting geopolitical landscapes since the Russia-Ukraine war, the European Union (EU) has enhanced its engagement with the five resource-rich Central Asian countries in regional connectivity, trade, and energy, The Caspian Post reports citing Observer Research Foundation.
The first EU-Central Asia Summit was held in Samarkand on 3 and 4 April 2025 to lend momentum to this evolving strategic partnership. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, European Council President Antonio Costa, and the leaders of the five Central Asian nations (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) discussed the potential of the bilateral geopolitical, geoeconomic, and trade ties.
The strong ties with the EU present the Central Asian Republics with an opportunity to diversify their foreign policy, which for decades has remained under the cooperative hegemony of Russia and China.
In addition to the US$ 10.6 billion investments in the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor (TITR) in 2024, the EU announced a US$ 13.2 billion investment package in Central Asia during the Summit. Strong connectivity with Central Asia lends direct access to the EU for increased regional trade, especially for its ever-increasing domestic demand for energy and critical raw materials. On the other hand, the strong ties with the EU present the Central Asian Republics with an opportunity to diversify their foreign policy, which for decades has remained under the cooperative hegemony of Russia and China.
EU’s Growing Strategic Interests in Central Asia
In today’s dynamic geopolitical environment, enhancing ties with Central Asia, which holds substantial geostrategic and geoeconomic significance, has become the EU’s fundamental goal. The increasing geopolitical contestations have compelled the EU to reevaluate its foreign policy and establish new, sustainable, diversified supply chains for energy and critical minerals needed in strategic sectors. The EU-Central Asia summit occurred when other major players concentrated on their strategic issues. For example, Russia’s actions in Ukraine, China’s trade conflicts, and the United States’ (US) protectionist policies under the Trump administration. Commending the region's strategic location, Von der Leyen emphasised four main areas for cooperation: connectivity, raw materials, clean energy, and digital connectivity. Following the Russia-Ukraine war, connectivity emerged as the highest priority for both regions through the TITR initiative under the EU’s Global Gateway Strategy. The TITR connects landlocked Central Asia to Europe via the South Caucasus, achieving 4.5 million tonnes in container transportation in 2024, with a target of 10 million tonnes by 2027. Due to modernisation and infrastructure challenges, only 100,000 containers are being shipped from Central Asia to the EU. At the summit, the EU earmarked US$ 3.4 billion to enhance connectivity and modernise the TITR, which has the potential to enable the EU to receive approximately 800,000 containers each year.
The increasing geopolitical contestations have compelled the EU to reevaluate its foreign policy and establish new, sustainable, diversified supply chains for energy and critical minerals needed in strategic sectors.
The EU is Central Asia’s second-largest trade partner, representing 22.6 percent of the region’s foreign trade. It is also the biggest investor in the region, accounting for over 40 percent of all investments. The EU mainly imports crude oil, gas, and metals and has negotiated enhanced partnership and cooperation agreements (EPCAs) with all Central Asian nations except Turkmenistan. Additionally, Central Asia boasts extensive reserves of essential minerals, such as uranium, along with 40 percent of the world’s key resources like lithium, graphite, and manganese. Kazakhstan alone produces 19 of the 34 minerals vital for the EU economy. Meanwhile, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan hold reserves of 71, 17, and 43 critical minerals, respectively.
As of 2023, the EU relies on imports from China, Malaysia, and Russia for 94 percent of its rare earth elements, raising concerns about the stability of the supply chain disruptions. The EU is working to reduce its dependence on countries like China and Russia, and at the summit, it allocated US$3.69 billion towards essential raw materials in Central Asia. Addressing the significance of the region's critical minerals and global competitors, Von Der Leyen, without mentioning China, stated that other powers are “only interested in exploiting and extracting.” She assured the EU would adopt a different approach by preserving local industries and values. The EU has also prioritised developing renewable energy projects and hydrocarbons in Central Asia as the region grapples with the increasing impacts of climate change. The EU will invest around US$7.2 billion in these projects, and leaders agreed to hold another investors' summit later this year to develop connectivity, especially TITR.
Central Asia: Navigating Geopolitical Crosscurrents
Central Asian countries have made progress in resolving enduring regional conflicts. Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan only recently finalised their border demarcation by signing the Khujand Declaration. These border disputes have historically hindered cooperation and integration in Central Asia, leading to border skirmishes. Now, Central Asian nations are developing new trade routes to boost regional trade and collaborate on industrial efforts. However, tensions in the broader Eurasian region, especially involving Azerbaijan and Armenia, could overshadow the growing strategic connections between the EU and Central Asia. The conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia escalated the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in 2023, forcing thousands of ethnic Armenians to flee to Armenia. TITR and most of the gas and oil supplies from Central Asia to the EU run through the South Caucasus.
China has conducted numerous joint military exercises with countries in Central Asia and offered training and defence technology both bilaterally and multilaterally.
Following the Summit, Russia initiated joint counterterrorism military drills with Tajikistan and increased its cultural diplomacy efforts. In parallel, with the growing significance of TITR, Beijing is seeking to align the BRI with TITR in the South Caucasus, especially in Georgia and Azerbaijan. China has also invested heavily in gas, oil and other critical minerals and imports 30 percent of its gas from the region. Beijing also leverages the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) to strengthen its hard power in the area. China has conducted numerous joint military exercises with countries in Central Asia and offered training and defence technology both bilaterally and multilaterally.
Conclusion
For decades, China and Russia’s increasing influence has constrained the import and export capabilities, as well as foreign policy options, of Central Asian countries. Nevertheless, Central Asian nations seem increasingly inclined to engage with Europe and other partners to restore their standing in the evolving global landscape. Although the EU has not officially challenged Russia and China, it actively seeks to provide alternatives and create strategic autonomy in trade, connectivity, critical mineral extraction, and various other sectors for both regions. The growing EU commitment to stronger relations with the region will foster regional integration and enhance economic ties between the two areas. However, effectiveness depends on the ability of regional leaders to collaborate and prioritise economic growth over geopolitical rivalries and disputes, both in Central Asia and the South Caucasus.
BY Ayjaz Wani (PhD), Fellow in the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation
