"China has played a transformative role in shaping the geopolitical dynamics of Central Asia and the South Caucasus through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which aims to bolster connectivity and promote economic integration across Eurasia."
The Caspian Post presents an exclusive interview with Tugrul Keskin, a Turkish professor and former director of the Center for Global Governance at Shanghai University.
- How do you evaluate China's role in shaping the new geopolitical reality in Central Asia and the South Caucasus? To what extent is China actively integrating these regions into its initiatives, such as the Belt and Road Initiative?
- China has played a transformative role in shaping the geopolitical dynamics of Central Asia and the South Caucasus through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which aims to bolster connectivity and promote economic integration across Eurasia. Central Asia serves as a critical hub for the BRI’s overland routes, with China making substantial investments in infrastructure to streamline trade and transportation. For example, the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan International Highway has strengthened regional connectivity and advanced economic integration. Furthermore, China has invested in renewable energy initiatives, such as a $47 million wind farm in Kazakhstan, contributing to the diversification of the region's energy sources.
China's expanding economic footprint in Central Asia has occasionally challenged Russia’s traditional influence in the region. The increasing reliance on Chinese investments in sectors like railways and renewable energy has diminished Central Asia’s dependence on Russian exports and labor. Reflecting this shift, China's trade volume with Central Asia reached $89 billion in 2023.
In the South Caucasus, China has similarly pursued BRI-related projects to enhance regional connectivity. The Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, also known as the "Iron Silk Road," links Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkiye, facilitating trade between China and Europe. Additionally, China’s investments in developing the Port of Baku aim to establish a strategic hub along the BRI’s trade routes. In Uzbekistan, China's archaeological projects have sought to highlight historical ties along the Silk Road, potentially reshaping perceptions of Chinese civilization’s influence in the region.
By actively integrating Central Asia and the South Caucasus into its broader initiatives, particularly through the BRI, China has significantly reshaped these regions' geopolitical and economic landscapes, fostering growth and improving connectivity.
- What are the main challenges you see in China's relations with Islamic movements in Central Asia and the Caucasus, and how do these challenges impact the overall stability of these regions?
- Once, Putin remarked that carrying a scorpion in your pocket means facing the consequences, referencing Erdoğan’s support for Islamic movements in Syria. Islamic movements in global politics represent a relatively modern phenomenon. Most of these movements aim to overthrow existing regimes to establish religiously-based systems of governance. In contrast, modern states seek to implement secular legal frameworks that allow diverse populations to coexist peacefully. This inherent conflict between Islamic movements and modern state structures presents challenges for governments worldwide, including those in China, Russia, the United States, and Central Asia.
China's engagement with Islamic movements in Central Asia and the Caucasus is shaped by a mix of geopolitical, religious, and socio-economic challenges, which have significant implications for regional stability:
China's strict control over Uyghur Muslims under the guise of combating terrorism and extremism is met with skepticism by Islamic movements in Central Asia and the Caucasus. This fosters resentment among Muslim populations, encouraging solidarity with Uyghurs and straining China's relations with regional governments, which may face domestic pressure to oppose Chinese policies.
Central Asia and the Caucasus serve as arenas for competition among major powers like China, Russia, the United States, and Turkiye. While Russia and Turkiye have historical and cultural ties to Islamic movements, China’s efforts to extend its influence risk clashing with their interests. Such rivalries can polarize local politics and create instability if Islamic movements align with opposing powers.
Through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has invested heavily in regional infrastructure and energy projects. However, local communities often perceive these investments as exploitative, sparking protests and opposition. Islamic movements may exploit these grievances, framing opposition to China in religious or nationalist terms, further inflaming tensions.
Radical Islamic movements, including groups with origins in Afghanistan, Pakistan, or the Middle East, may target China due to its Xinjiang policies. Organizations like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) or remnants of Al-Qaeda affiliates could attack Chinese interests, disrupting regional security and economic cooperation.
China’s atheistic state ideology and restrictions on Islamic practices alienate deeply religious communities in Central Asia and the Caucasus. This cultural divide erodes trust and provides fertile ground for anti-China narratives, undermining Beijing’s soft power and increasing the potential for unrest.
The rise of groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir in Central Asia challenges China’s efforts to maintain secular governance in the region. These movements could inspire Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang or amplify demands for greater religious freedoms, potentially destabilizing China’s border regions.
China counters these challenges by promoting economic development, leveraging the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) for security cooperation, and fostering goodwill through cultural exchanges. However, these efforts are often undermined by its domestic policies. Navigating these complexities requires China to balance respect for local cultural and religious sensitivities with its economic and security goals. Failure to address these issues risks destabilizing Central Asia and the Caucasus, jeopardizing China's broader strategic objectives.
- How do you assess the influence of Turkiye's political and economic activities in the South Caucasus and Central Asia? To what extent do these efforts compete with or complement China's strategic interests in these regions?
- Turkiye’s political and economic activities in the South Caucasus and Central Asia have expanded significantly over the past three decades, shaped by historical, cultural, and geopolitical factors. However, Turkish foreign policy under the JDP/AKP has shifted toward more pan-Islamism rather than a secular, modern foreign policy. Consequently, Turkiye has established cultural network organizations in the region, such as universities, mosques, and other institutions. These efforts both compete with and complement China’s strategic interests, depending on the issue and region.
Turkiye leverages shared linguistic, cultural, and historical ties with Turkic-speaking nations like Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. These connections foster a sense of kinship that strengthens Turkiye’s soft power. While not as overt as in the past, Turkiye promotes a vision of cooperation among Turkic states through organizations like the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), positioning Ankara as a unifying leader.
Turkiye is heavily involved in energy infrastructure projects, such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, which connects Caspian oil and gas resources to Western markets. Turkish companies are active in construction, manufacturing, and services across the region. Turkiye supports infrastructure projects like the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (Middle Corridor), which connects Central Asia and the Caucasus to Europe via Turkiye, bypassing Russia.
Turkiye plays a role as a mediator in regional conflicts, such as the Nagorno-Karabakh issue between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Its military support for Azerbaijan during the 2020 conflict showcased its growing influence in the South Caucasus. Turkiye engages in defense cooperation, providing military training and equipment to regional partners, especially Azerbaijan and Central Asian states. Through institutions like the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) and NGOs, Turkiye promotes a moderate Sunni Islamic model that appeals to the predominantly Muslim populations in these regions. Turkish universities, cultural centers (e.g., Yunus Emre Institutes), and media outlets have a growing presence, further enhancing Turkiye’s soft power.
China’s Strategic Interests in the South Caucasus and Central Asia:
China’s investments in infrastructure, energy, and trade networks aim to integrate Central Asia and the South Caucasus into its global economic framework. Central Asia is a key supplier of oil and natural gas to China, making the region crucial for Beijing’s energy diversification strategy. China seeks to prevent the spread of Islamist or separatist ideologies from Central Asia to its restive Xinjiang region. Through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), China collaborates with regional states to address terrorism and extremism. While China has significant economic influence, its cultural and political engagement is limited. Beijing’s approach prioritizes state-to-state relationships over grassroots or cultural diplomacy.
Competition Between Turkiye and China:
• Turkiye’s cultural and historical ties position it as a natural partner for Turkic-speaking nations, creating a soft power advantage over China, which lacks such connections.
• Turkiye’s Middle Corridor initiative competes with China’s Belt and Road projects for dominance in regional logistics and trade routes.
• Both Turkiye and China are involved in developing energy infrastructure in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, occasionally vying for access to resources and transit routes.
• Turkiye offers a more pluralistic political model compared to China’s authoritarian governance. This distinction appeals to some Central Asian leaders and populations seeking diversification in their foreign partnerships.
Complementarity Between Turkiye and China:
• Turkiye’s Middle Corridor complements China’s BRI by providing an alternative westward route that aligns with Beijing’s logistical goals.
• China and Turkiye often target different sectors and scales of investment, reducing direct economic competition.
• Both nations have an interest in regional stability, which supports their respective economic and geopolitical goals. For instance, Turkiye’s mediation in conflicts like Nagorno-Karabakh aligns with China’s preference for a stable investment environment.
Turkiye’s emphasis on shared cultural and Islamic values can clash with China’s secular governance, particularly regarding the treatment of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang. Central Asian and South Caucasian states may use Turkiye and China’s competing interests to their advantage, complicating bilateral cooperation. Turkiye’s activities in the South Caucasus and Central Asia reflect a mix of competition and complementarity with China’s strategic interests. While Turkiye competes with China in areas like cultural diplomacy, energy access, and regional influence, their economic initiatives often align in fostering connectivity and stability. The extent of competition or cooperation will depend on how both nations navigate their overlapping ambitions and adapt to the region’s evolving dynamics.
- Your research touches on Uyghur nationalism. In your view, how could the development of the Uyghur issue affect China's relations with its neighbors in Central Asia, particularly given their ethnic and religious proximity to the Uyghurs?
- The Uyghur issue represents a sensitive and multifaceted challenge in China's domestic and foreign policy, carrying significant implications for its relationships with neighboring Central Asian countries. These nations, sharing close ethnic, cultural, and religious ties with the Uyghurs, are particularly vulnerable to the ripple effects of China's policies in Xinjiang. Several factors influence how this issue could shape China's relations with its Central Asian neighbors, including ethnic and religious solidarity, refugee and diaspora dynamics, economic dependence, geopolitical rivalries, regional security cooperation, social and political stability, and China's long-term regional influence.
The Uyghurs' cultural and linguistic affinity with Turkic-speaking groups like Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and Uzbeks heightens the sensitivity of the issue. China's harsh measures in Xinjiang—such as mass detentions, restrictions on religious practices, and cultural assimilation—could incite public discontent in Central Asia. Public protests and criticism of China's actions may strain bilateral ties, particularly if regional governments are perceived as complicit or indifferent. Additionally, Islamic movements in Central Asia might leverage the Uyghur issue to challenge local governments or China, destabilizing the region.
Uyghurs fleeing persecution often seek refuge in neighboring states, particularly Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, presenting a humanitarian dilemma. These countries must navigate between humanitarian obligations and Beijing's demands for Uyghur repatriation. While forced returns risk domestic backlash and damage to governmental legitimacy, granting asylum could strain diplomatic relations with China, which frames the Uyghur issue as a counterterrorism matter.
Central Asia’s heavy reliance on Chinese investments and trade, particularly through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), complicates the situation. Economic dependence often discourages confrontation with China over the Uyghur issue, as governments prioritize economic ties over ethnic and religious solidarity. However, such prioritization may alienate local populations, spark unrest, and weaken regime legitimacy over time due to public dissatisfaction with perceived complicity in China’s actions.
Regional powers like Turkiye and Russia add another layer of complexity. Turkiye’s historical support for Uyghur causes, based on cultural and linguistic ties, could embolden Uyghur activism in Central Asia and challenge China's regional engagement. Meanwhile, Russia, despite its strategic alignment with China, might subtly use the Uyghur issue to undermine Beijing’s influence in its traditional sphere of control.
China relies on mechanisms like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to maintain regional security cooperation against terrorism, extremism, and separatism. However, Central Asian states’ reluctance to fully align with China's framing of Uyghur activism as terrorism could weaken these mechanisms. Diverging priorities within the SCO might expose vulnerabilities in regional security frameworks.
The Uyghur issue could also amplify broader grievances within Central Asian states, where authoritarian regimes suppress ethnic and religious dissent. Solidarity with Uyghurs might catalyze domestic unrest, with local opposition movements drawing parallels between Uyghur persecution and their own struggles. Governments may respond with intensified repression, further destabilizing the region.
China’s treatment of Uyghurs risks eroding its image as a benign regional partner, particularly among Central Asian populations. A loss of soft power could prompt these countries to seek alternative alliances with Turkiye, Russia, or Western powers, complicating Beijing's strategic goals. Perceptions of cultural and religious insensitivity might hinder China's ability to integrate these nations into its broader initiatives, such as the BRI.
Ultimately, the Uyghur issue serves as a potential flashpoint in China’s relations with Central Asia, given the ethnic, cultural, and religious proximities involved. While economic dependence and governance in Central Asia generally favor China’s influence, grassroots opposition and external pressures from regional powers like Turkiye could disrupt this dynamic. How China manages its Uyghur policies and engages with its neighbors will be critical to maintaining regional stability and advancing its ambitions.
