Central Asia is facing an impending energy crisis, with regional demand for imported natural gas projected to reach 25 billion cubic meters annually by 2030.
This looming shortfall is driven by rapid population growth, around one million people per year, industrial expansion, declining domestic production, and the deteriorating state of aging infrastructure, The Caspian Post reports citing The Times of Central Asia.
Recent accidents in Bishkek, Tashkent, Dushanbe, and Ekibastuz illustrate the scale and urgency of the problem.
Kazakhstan: Rising Output, Falling Exports
Kazakhstan produced 59.2 billion cubic meters of gas in 2024, representing a 6.4% increase from the previous year. However, nearly half of this was reinjected into oil reservoirs to sustain production. Only 29 billion cubic meters were available for domestic consumption. Soaring internal demand has already led to a sharp decline in exports to China, which fell 40% to 8.7 billion cubic meters.
Uzbekistan: From Exporter to Importer
Uzbekistan’s situation is even more precarious. In 2024, the country produced 44.6 billion cubic meters of gas and 713,400 tons of oil, figures that are in decline, dropping 4.5% and 8.5% respectively. To cover the shortfall, Tashkent has turned to Russia and Turkmenistan, purchasing $1.7 billion worth of gas. Uzbekneftegaz expects to produce just 26.5 billion cubic meters of commercial gas in 2025, far short of projected domestic needs.
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan produce virtually no hydrocarbons and rely entirely on imports of these resources. Meanwhile, demand continues to grow in tandem with their populations, and domestic energy generation falls short of even basic consumption needs.
Turkmenistan remains the region’s top gas exporter, sending 41.3 billion cubic meters abroad in 2024. However, Ashgabat’s ability to increase exports is limited by its own growing domestic consumption, binding long-term contracts with China, and a lack of large-scale infrastructure development.
Investment, Delays, and Structural Challenges
While Central Asian governments have announced plans for new hydroelectric plants, combined heat and power stations, and nuclear power facilities, tangible progress remains slow. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan have yet to break ground on any of their proposed nuclear power projects. Key obstacles include a shortage of qualified personnel, water scarcity, environmental concerns, and, above all, insufficient funding. Without substantial foreign investment, modernization efforts are likely to stall.
To ease financial pressures, countries in the region have begun raising gas and electricity tariffs. These price hikes aim to offset upgrade costs but have provoked public backlash and fueled inflation. In Uzbekistan, for instance, inflation accelerated to 15% in May 2025, with energy prices cited as the primary driver.
The Russian Option
Forecasts for regional gas imports remain imprecise, but analysts estimate the need could rise to 20-25 billion cubic meters annually by 2030. Russia appears poised to become the main supplier, though details of supply agreements, including pricing, volumes, and terms, have not been disclosed. Central Asian governments are attempting to keep cooperation with Moscow strictly within the economic sphere, wary of entangling political dependencies.
As a result, the region faces a dual challenge: securing energy stability through technological upgrades and infrastructure investment, while carefully navigating the geopolitical implications of increasing reliance on Russian gas.
