Georgia’s present political and diplomatic trajectory underscores a shift toward transactionalism, where foreign policy pragmatism replaces geopolitical fixation the countrhy has had.
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Following the October 26 elections, the Georgian Dream (GD) ruling party appears to have successfully managed both domestic opposition and heightened international scrutiny. However, the political environment in Georgia and shifting global dynamics suggest that relations between Georgia and the West will grow increasingly transactional, shaped by pragmatism rather than shared values or mutual trust, The Caspian Post reports.
Despite accusations of election rigging, GD’s ability to secure a narrow majority (54%) highlighted both its resilience and the challenges facing the fragmented opposition. Major opposition groups, remain divided by ideological and personal rivalries, limiting their capacity to mount a unified challenge.
The opposition’s post-election protests, while vocal, have failed to mobilize significant public support or present concrete evidence of alleged large-scale electoral fraud. This lack of cohesion and strategic planning has weakened their credibility among voters. Additionally, skepticism lingers over the opposition’s boycott of parliamentary participation, as similar stances in 2020 were eventually reversed, disappointing their base.
President Salome Zurabishvili, once viewed as a potential unifier for the opposition, has also struggled to rally diverse factions. Nonetheless, GD’s inability to secure a constitutional majority demonstrates the opposition’s latent influence, as nearly half of the electorate voted against the ruling party.
GD has also benefited from a changing global context. Disruptive elections in key Western countries—such as Donald Trump’s return to the U.S. presidency and the collapse of Germany’s government—have shifted international attention away from Georgia.
Although the election results are likely to be grudgingly accepted by both international observers and the opposition, relations with Washington and Brussels remain at their lowest point since Georgia’s independence. The West, preoccupied with internal problems and other strategic priorities, is unlikely and in fact unwilling to exert significant pressure on Tbilisi. This means that the West’s approach to Georgia is expected to become more pragmatic. While neither side benefits from a complete breakdown of ties, meaningful progress is unlikely.
In case of Georgia’s relations with the EU the latter is expected to freeze relations at their current state, avoiding escalation but withholding EU membership talks with Tbilisi. The visa-free regime will likely remain intact, serving as a key lever in EU-Georgia relations. When it comes to Washington its attention shifting to the Middle East and Indo-Pacific regions, U.S. involvement in the South Caucasus, including Georgia, is likely to diminish.
Surely, this does not mean that the Western engagement in the South Caucasus and Georgia specifically is irrevocably in decline. There is a mutual process of re-evaluation of bilateral ties. One of the likeliest results could be that Tbilisi may attempt to normalize ties with Brussels by offering concessions, such as withdrawing controversial laws, including the “agents law.” However, GD’s commitment to these changes remains uncertain. After all, the too much of political energy was put into implementing the law.
As Western engagement in the region in question, GD is expected to deepen ties with Eurasian powers, such as China, Turkey, perhaps even Iran to a limited degree. This will goes hand in hand with maintaining selective commitments to the EU to appease Georgia’s pro-European population. Recent polls reveal that 90% of Georgians support EU membership, and 89% oppose alignment with Russia, pressuring the ruling party to tread cautiously. Tbilisi will also be open to more constructive engagement with Russia, though the issue of occupied territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia will constitute a major problem.
Georgia’s present political and diplomatic trajectory underscores a shift toward transactionalism, where foreign policy pragmatism replaces geopolitical fixation the countrhy has had. Tbilisi now would prefer to diversify its foreign policy and pursue the so-called multivectorism. This approach may offer Georgia a breathing space. But a critical component of this strategic approach is to maintain good ties simultaneously with a number of big players, which obviously includes the EU too.
Thus all comes down to balancing in foreign policy – a radical shift from previous years and decades when Georgia was unequivocally West-leaning. And Georgia is not the only country to pursue the same line. In fact, all of Georgia’s neighbors have been pursuing some level of multi-vector foreign policy. Azerbaijan and Turkey are good examples and even Armenia has made some strides toward this goal. The trend has become truly regional.
Emil Avdaliani
