Authors’ note: Many of the details included in this case study are drawn from interviews with Azerbaijani soldiers conducted during a research trip to the site of the battle in March 2025. Also of note, while many towns and villages in the Karabakh region have both Armenian and Azerbaijani names, the authors have chosen to use the Azerbaijani names since the international community recognizes the region as being part of Azerbaijan. As a final note, Azerbaijanis refer to the region as Karabakh, but we chose to use the name “Nagorno-Karabakh” for this article given that is the name more widely used by Western media and think tanks. The word “Nagorno” means mountainous in Russian and was added to “Karabakh” during the Soviet era.
The Battle of Hadrut occurred from October 5 to 10, 2020, during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War (September 27-November 10, 2020). Hadrut was the capital of a province of the same name in Nagorno-Karabakh’s southeast. The Armenians had captured Nagorno-Karabakh and seven other Azerbaijani regions during the First Nagorno-Karabakh War (1988-1994). Hadrut’s location-anchoring a narrow corridor between Jabrayil and the most important cities within Nagorno-Karabakh-made it a tactically and operationally significant objective for Azerbaijani forces and a key defensive node for Armenia.
Hadrut sits at an elevation of 733 meters in a bowl-shaped valley, encircled by rugged, high mountains. Prominent peaks near Hadrut include Mount Shishdag (1,314 meters in elevation) to the south, mount Pillan (1,488 meters) to the southwest, Mount Gullukar (1,692 meters) to the west, and Mount Ergunesh (1,463 meters) to the north. The northern side of the mountain slopes are densely forested, while southern exposures are largely clear-providing excellent observation but minimal cover or concealment.
Four primary routes provide access to the town. A two-lane paved road to the east connects Hadrut to the R40 highway running between Jabrayil and Fuzuli. A narrow, winding road exits Hadrut to the north, cresting a mountain pass (1,080 meters) roughly four kilometers away. The small village of Girmizigaya lies halfway up this route. A dirt road exits Hadrut to the west and splits into two mountainous trails, one running south and the other southeast.
The town itself covers approximately 1.7 square kilometers and had a prewar population of 3,100, though most civilians fled prior to or during the battle. Four nearby villages-Edisha, Taghaser, Chinarli, and Daghdoshu-are situated one to two hundred meters up the surrounding slopes to the town’s west, southwest, and south. Hadrut’s internal layout follows an irregular street pattern shaped by the steep terrain, with roads aligned to the contours of the hillsides. Most buildings are one to two stories in height and constructed primarily of cinderblock, local stone, and mudbrick. Notable exceptions include a three-story building at the base of a hill in the town’s west and a five-story structure on a military base in the eastern part of the town.
The Battle
Azerbaijan launched its offensive on September 27, 2020, with the aim of recapturing territories that it lost to Armenia during the First Nagorno-Karabakh War. Among these territories was the Nagorno-Karabakh region, which had remained internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan but contested by the Armenians. On October 4, Azerbaijani forces seized the city of Jabrayil, located approximately fourteen kilometers southeast of the line of contact and eight kilometers (straight line) south of Hadrut. From there, the lead Azerbaijani corps turned north toward the interior of Nagorno-Karabakh, while another corps continued advancing southeast.
The rugged, mountainous terrain in the region funneled movement along a limited number of roads that connected small cities, towns, and villages. Hadrut was the first and largest urban area along the route between Jabrayil and central Nagorno-Karabakh, making it tactically, operationally, and strategically significant. Its capture would provide Azerbaijan with a foothold to advance deeper into the contested region, while its defense was essential for Armenian forces seeking to slow or halt that advance.
The Armenians maintained a large military base on the eastern edge of Hadrut that housed the headquarters of their 18th Motorized Rifle Division, along with several subordinate units. They positioned approximately 150-200 soldiers in the mountains south of Hadrut, with the primary defense of the town left to more than five hundred reservists and a smaller number of regular army soldiers. These units were equipped primarily with small arms, machine guns, mortars, and a limited number of antitank guided missiles (ATGMs)-such as Fagots, Kornets, and other, mainly Soviet-era systems-which were used with some success against advancing Azerbaijani vehicles. Additional Armenian forces-possibly a brigade or more-were based north of Hadrut, beyond the mountain pass, and could reinforce Hadrut within several hours.
Armenia’s overall defensive strategy relied on halting any Azerbaijani advance at the line of contact. The plan was either to defeat the offensive outright or to hold long enough for Russian diplomatic pressure to impose a ceasefire, as had occurred during previous escalations. However, once Azerbaijani forces broke through both the first and second echelon defensive lines, Armenian commanders were forced to improvise a new defense while already under pressure.
After Jabrayil fell, the Armenians only had two to three days to prepare Hadrut’s defenses. Yet even this small window was poorly used. Instead of fortifying strongpoints or establishing coordinated kill zones within the urban terrain, defenders laid only limited minefields and created few obstacles. There was no effort to develop an in-depth urban defense or prepare fallback positions. This lack of preparation was compounded by confusion and disorganization among retreating units-some of which were undertrained conscripts from the 9th Regiment’s training battalion or elements recently pushed out of Jabrayil. As a result, Armenian forces failed to capitalize on the town’s inherent defensive advantages and entered the battle in a position of tactical and psychological disadvantage.
In contrast to the Armenians’ lack of preparation, the Azerbaijanis developed an effective attack plan. The Azerbaijani Southern Group command assigned the mission to seize Hadrut to its special operations forces and organized a reinforced combined arms formation for the operation-effectively creating a joint task force. This force included two battalions of the Azerbaijani Special Forces (each numbering 100-120 soldiers) and two battalions from the Azerbaijani Commando Brigades (each with 200-250 soldiers). To provide additional firepower and mobility, a mechanized infantry brigade-with three battalions of BTR-80 armored personnel carriers, BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles, and T-72 tanks-was attached. A motorized infantry brigade, consisting of four battalions equipped with transport vehicles, also reinforced the effort. In total, the Azerbaijani Southern Group committed an estimated four to five thousand soldiers (including the joint task force and artillery, antitank, engineer, and signal units) to the operation, though only a small portion of this force was dedicated to fighting within Hadrut. The assault was further supported by artillery, attack helicopters, fighter/bombers, and a range of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), including Turkish TB2 Bayraktars and Israeli-made loitering munitions. The plan hinged on securing the key terrain surrounding Hadrut: the high ground near Mount Shishdag, Mount Pillan, Mount Gullukar, and Mount Ergunesh, along with the two mountain passes.
To reach Hadrut, the joint task force had to traverse a small mountain range that included Mount Shishdag and was defended by two Armenian infantry companies. The Armenians established defensive positions along the high ground of the mountain range, anchored by one company in the northeast and a reinforced platoon to the southwest. In between, the Armenians had two battle positions consisting of approximately fifteen soldiers each. Soldiers in each defensive position were armed with small arms, machine guns, and ATGMs, in addition to having artillery support. These positions were arrayed along narrow ridgelines with steep elevation gains, offering the defenders strong observation and clear fields of fire. The Armenian ATGM teams had clear lines of sight on chokepoints along the valley floors.
For the advance to Hadrut, one commando battalion moved along the high ground in the west to secure the left flank and the second commando battalion advanced along the high ground in the east to secure the right flank, while the two special forces battalions advanced up the two valleys in the center of the mountain ranges. One mechanized infantry battalion followed in support of one of the special forces battalions. The remainder of the mechanized and motorized brigades followed, with the mission to secure high ground surrounding Hadrut. This multipronged maneuver allowed the joint task force to apply pressure across a wide frontage, reducing the risk of channeling into a single axis. The elevation and vegetation provided some cover for the commandos on the flanks, while the central special forces columns had to advance through more exposed terrain with little cover or concealment.
On October 5, special forces battalions began advancing up the valley, moving from hilltop to hilltop. In the open terrain, the Azerbaijanis suffered numerous casualties, to include the loss of several logistics vehicles that were hit by ATGMs. Yet, despite the advantageous terrain, the Armenian positions could not mutually support one another and, thus, were not integrated into a coordinated defense. Their communications were limited and their fallback plans were nonexistent. Once engaged, each outpost fought largely in isolation, enabling Azerbaijani forces to apply overwhelming local superiority at the point of contact.
The special forces battalion attacking the Armenian battle position on Mount Shishdag found the position particularly difficult to assault given the steepness of the terrain, so the battalion commander sent four soldiers around the mountain to attack the position from the rear. The battalion eventually eliminated the position, but not before suffering several casualties, to include a commander that was shot by an Armenian sniper while trying to raise an Azerbaijani flag after eliminating the position.
The commandos on the western flank eliminated the reinforced platoon position while the second special forces battalion eliminated the other small battle position. The commandos on the right flank found the company-sized position especially challenging but eventually eliminated it with the help of a T-72 tank platoon from an attached mechanized battalion. UAVs, including Turkish TB2s and Israeli loitering munitions, played a critical role in this phase, providing real-time surveillance and suppressing enemy strongpoints ahead of advancing infantry. These precision strikes enabled maneuver elements to fix Armenian units, accelerating the collapse of resistance across the ridge. With the outer defensive line dismantled and the flanks secured, Azerbaijani forces rapidly transitioned from mountain maneuver to an urban assault posture.
On October 7, after securing control of the high ground to the south and west of Hadrut, the joint task force was ready to start its assault on the town. One commando battalion occupied the mountains to the west of Hadrut to secure the western flank, while the second commando battalion and the motorized brigade continued to guard the eastern flank. The two special forces battalions occupied high ground south of Hadrut near Mount Shishdag and prepared for their assault into the town with three tanks in support. A fourth tank had been destroyed after hitting a land mine on the trail near the enemy position on Mount Shishdag. A company from the mechanized brigade followed one of the special forces battalions, while the remainder of the mechanized brigade secured the heights to the west of Hadrut. The motorized brigade followed the commando battalion in the east and then started its advance on Hadrut along the road from Hadrut’s east.
With the heights to Hadrut’s south and west secured, the special forces battalions began their downhill advance toward the town through the dense woods on the northern side of the mountain range with the three remaining tanks occupying support-by-fire positions from a trail along the mountains above the town. Together the ground forces and air reconnaissance platforms identified roughly one hundred enemy targets within Hadrut and started engaging them with TB-2 UAVs, loitering munitions, tanks, artillery, and aircraft.
On the morning of October 8, the two special forces battalions and the attached mechanized company started clearing Hadrut, but for one battalion, its stay did not last long. At the start of the battle, the Armenians had a company-sized position on Mount Ergunash, but it quickly grew to a battalion-sized element as Armenian forces fled the town. The Azerbaijani joint task force commander dispatched one of the special forces battalions to eliminate the now battalion-sized element. Some of the heaviest fighting in the battle occurred on the mountain. The two special forces battalions spent much of the day eliminating enemy positions within Hadrut and on Mount Ergunash. To facilitate combat operations, the Azerbaijanis established civilian corridors to encourage noncombatants to leave the town. The Azerbaijanis estimate that less than two hundred remained in Hadrut at the end of the battle. To make the Armenian defenders believe the outnumbered attackers had more forces within Hadrut than they really had and to confuse them as to the direction of their main attack, the Azerbaijanis used loud devices to produce the sounds of gunfire throughout the town.
On October 9, the joint task force deputy commander established a command post on the top of a hill in Hadrut’s west to provide better observation over the town and the road entering Hadrut from the mountain pass to the north. The forward positioning of the command post demonstrated the confidence Azerbaijani commanders had in their control over the southern and western approaches, even as the threat from the north remained acute. The Armenians recognized the precariousness of the situation. If they lost Hadrut, the Azerbaijanis would have an open route to the center of Nagorno-Karabakh. As such, they acted with a sense of urgency to send reinforcements to help defend the town. Soon, a motorized infantry battalion came over the mountain pass, dismounted at the village of Girmizigaya, two kilometers up the mountain road north of Hadrut, and then continued down to the town.
With one special forces battalion heavily engaged in battle on Mount Ergunash and the other battalion within Hadrut, the Azerbaijanis were now in a precarious situation, as they still remained heavily outnumbered within the town, by a ratio of ten to one according to at least one Armenian soldier. The Armenian counterattack made it to within danger close artillery range (four hundred meters) of the deputy commander’s position, but he was able to hold them off with UAV strikes and artillery fire including eight 122-millimeter Grad rockets. This moment represented a near climax in the battle, as Azerbaijani forces were tactically dislocated-one special forces battalion on Mount Ergunash, the other inside Hadrut, and command elements under direct threat. Their ability to call in precise artillery and drone strikes was decisive in preventing a breakthrough.
Unlike many urban battles, in which the defender strongpoints buildings and uses mouseholes to move between defensive positions surreptitiously, in this battle the Armenians did not. Much of the fighting happened on the street as opposed to within the buildings. As such, the special forces were able to clear much of Hadrut without moving as a combined arms team. There were few obstacles for engineers to clear, and rarely did they need to enter and clear buildings using heavy munitions. This allowed the attacking force to leave its tanks in support-by-fire positions on the outside of the town. The Azerbaijanis did make extremely effective use of their UAVs to conduct precision strikes within Hadrut. At this point the Armenians still had at least two to five hundred soldiers within the town assigned to defend it, but they were in complete disarray. There were reports of friendly fire resulting from active duty Armenian soldiers firing on fleeing reservists after mistaking them for advancing Azerbaijani forces.
Around 4:00 pm, some of the Azerbaijani forces raised a flag from a building in Hadrut. This likely contributed to Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev declaring Hadrut liberated around 5:00 pm, but his declaration was a bit premature. The heaviest fighting-possibly of the entire war-occurred the following day. Yet, he was not far off the mark.
On October 10, the joint task force brought in additional conventional forces to help clear the remaining pockets of resistance from within Hadrut. They dedicated one motorized infantry company to help clear the town from the east, while the remainder of the brigade secured the military base and maintained a blocking position east of the town. During the fighting on the military base, Azerbaijani forces killed Colonel Hrair Davtyan, the deputy commander of the Armenians’ 18th Motorized Rifle Division. Other elements from the conventional brigades also cleared the small villages of Edisha, Taghaser, Chinarli, and Daghdoshu, just outside Hadrut.
At some point during the battle, the special forces brought the tanks forward to assist the forces within Hadrut, but two never made it. An Armenian soldier that was hiding in a church on the mountainside south of the town disabled one of the tanks with an ATGM as it was crossing a bridge over a ravine on the town’s western edge. As one of the remaining tanks attempted to recover the damaged tank and clear it from the bridge, it slipped off the road and into the ravine where it would remain until being recovered two days after the battle ended. This incident illustrated the risk of mobility in mountainous urban terrain-narrow bridges and ravines left armor vulnerable to concealed ATGM teams, and recovery operations became tactically significant events. By the end of day, the Azerbaijanis had secured most of the high ground around Hadrut but had not yet seized control of the mountain pass north of the town.
On October 11, the joint task force had finally cleared enough of the enemy from Mount Ergunash to dedicate a platoon-sized element to guard the mountain pass. This force, however, lacked sufficient size and weaponry-it had no ATGMs-and was forced to retreat after failing to destroy a company-sized Armenian counterattack element. Azerbaijani forces eventually destroyed the Armenian unit with supporting fires. Later that day, the attached conventional forces arrived at the mountain pass, finally establishing a defensive position with the necessary firepower to ward off future counterattacks. Between October 9 and 11, Armenian forces conducted at least four counterattacks along this mountain road, each involving company-sized or larger elements. All were soundly defeated.
By the end of October 11, the Azerbaijanis had fully secured Mount Ergunash and the northern mountain pass, eliminating the last remaining obstacles for their advance deeper into Nagorno-Karabakh. Neither side reported specific casualty figures for the battle, making it difficult to assess losses. Similarly, no comprehensive studies have been published evaluating the scale of destruction to Hadrut itself. What is clear, however, is that the level of damage was lower than in many comparable urban battles. This was likely due less to Azerbaijani restraint-though available evidence suggests they did attempt to limit collateral damage-and more to the Armenian failure to incorporate the urban terrain into their defense. With few buildings fortified and little resistance mounted from within the town itself, Azerbaijani forces had little need to demolish structures in order to advance. The absence of prepared strongpoints, barricades, or booby-trapped positions significantly reduced the destructiveness of the fight. Ultimately, the Armenians’ decision to defend from outside Hadrut rather than within it shaped both the tempo and the physical toll of the battle.
Lessons Learned
At the strategic level, the first lesson of the Battle of Hadrut is that even small urban areas can hold outsized tactical, operational, and strategic importance. Hadrut had a population of only 3,100 residents, but its location-anchoring a narrow corridor between Jabrayil and central Nagorno-Karabakh-meant any advance into the heart of the contested region had to pass through it. Given the surrounding mountainous terrain, there was no viable way to bypass Hadrut with mechanized forces. It was also home to the headquarters of Armenia’s 18th Motorized Rifle Division, making it both a command hub and a symbol of Armenian control over southern Nagorno-Karabakh. Its capture opened the road north and dealt a severe blow to Armenian morale and cohesion.
At the operational level, the battle reinforced that relying on a single defensive line is a flawed strategy. The Armenian defense centered on the Ohanyan Barrier-the defensive line along the line of contact named after former Armenian Defense Minister Seyran Ohanyan. It was a formidable system, consisting of multiple rows of trenches, minefields, antitank ditches, and wire obstacles. In many areas, the Ohanyan Barrier reached 325-600 meters in depth. Second-echelon forces, positioned 2,500 meters behind the first line, had their own defensive barrier. But like the Maginot Line in World War II, the Ohanyan Barrier was static. Once Azerbaijani forces breached the first and second echelon lines, Armenian forces had no prepared fallback positions and no coordinated plan to defend the territory behind it. Commanders were forced to improvise a defense while already in contact, and defenders had just over a week to prepare Hadrut-a key urban area they ultimately failed to use to their advantage. The absence of a true defense in depth accelerated the collapse of the southern front.
A second operational lesson is the importance of task-organizing special operations and conventional forces into integrated formations. Azerbaijan’s special forces were highly trained and well-prepared for operating in both urban and mountainous environments, but they lacked the firepower and mass required for sustained offensive operations. Conversely, the mechanized and motorized brigades attached to them brought that firepower but were composed largely of conscripts with limited tactical initiative. In the early stages of the campaign, special operations forces operated independently. But the assault on Hadrut demanded a different approach. The Southern Group command recognized that special operations forces would be essential for seizing Hadrut, but that they could not do it alone. To compensate, commanders task-organized a mechanized infantry brigade and a motorized infantry brigade under the operational control of the special operations forces, effectively creating a joint task force. This level of force integration-blending precision and professionalism with armored mobility and firepower-proved decisive in the complex terrain around Hadrut.
A third operational lesson is the need for dedicated urban warfare training and preparation. Azerbaijan began training its special forces for urban operations as early as 2014, even constructing mock urban terrain on military bases. These forces’ ability to navigate complex terrain, coordinate drone and indirect fire, and execute small-unit flanking maneuvers reflected years of institutional preparation. The Armenians, by contrast, had assumed that combat would occur along the line of contact and had not trained or equipped their units to fight or defend in dense or elevated urban environments. When battle shifted into cities like Hadrut, they were unprepared-both mentally and materially-to fight for them.
At the tactical level, the failure of the Armenian defenders to use the urban terrain of Hadrut is one of the most consequential aspects of the battle. Rather than fortifying buildings, establishing strongpoints, or creating defensive obstacles, Armenian forces largely abandoned the town’s interior and repositioned to surrounding high ground such as Mount Ergunash. While the mountain provided elevated fields of fire, it offered no substitute for the defensive depth and concealment that urban terrain can provide. The result was a faster-than-expected Azerbaijani advance through the town. Despite being initially outnumbered, Azerbaijani special forces were able to clear Hadrut in just a few days, largely because there was no determined defense from within the town itself. Had Armenian forces prepared even a basic urban defense-blocking roads, barricading entrances, digging trenches and tunnels, and creating kill zones-the fight for Hadrut could have taken weeks, possibly long enough for external pressure to impose a ceasefire and prevent further Azerbaijani gains. Instead, the decision to defend from outside the town ceded its most defensible ground and hastened its fall.
A second tactical lesson is that despite technological advances in warfare, terrain still matters. The Azerbaijanis accurately recognized they needed to control the key terrain-the high ground-around Hadrut to isolate it from reinforcement before a full assault. Understanding the urban terrain-its type, form, and function-is vital to preparing successful urban operations. Hadrut sat in a bowl-shaped valley, encircled by mountains that offered both defensive advantage and tactical risk. By seizing Mount Shishdag, Mount Pillan, and Mount Gullukar to Hadrut’s south and west and the mountain pass to the southwest, Azerbaijani forces gained commanding views over the town, allowing them to assault it with a surprisingly low number of troops. These positions enabled precise fires, shaped the tempo of the assault, and created the conditions for isolation. Even in an age of UAVs and long-range precision fires, holding the high ground remains essential to dominating complex urban terrain.
A final tactical lesson is that dismounted soldiers remain essential in modern warfare, even in battles dominated by UAVs. Much has been made of the role that UAVs played in Azerbaijan’s success in the war, and UAVs were certainly instrumental in Hadrut, particularly in identifying enemy positions and disrupting Armenian counterattacks in open terrain. But UAVs alone could not seize the town. Azerbaijani special forces still had to climb steep ridgelines under fire, clear buildings, and hold terrain under difficult conditions. At one point, they operated inside Hadrut at as much as a ten-to-one numerical disadvantage and still gained the upper hand. UAVs were force multipliers-but dismounted troops carried the battle. Hadrut demonstrates that while technology can enhance battlefield effectiveness, it does not replace the need for skilled soldiers to clear and hold complex urban terrain.
Conclusion
Although much of the fighting occurred outside the urban area, the Battle of Hadrut must be understood as an urban battle. The defenders’ decision not to utilize the town’s defensive potential-its stone structures, narrow approaches, and elevation changes-was pivotal. By failing to fight from within the urban terrain, Armenian forces forfeited their most advantageous ground. That decision accelerated the fall of Hadrut and shaped the remainder of the war.
Once Hadrut was lost, Azerbaijan gained a clear route into the heart of Nagorno-Karabakh. The town’s capture marked a tipping point, after which Armenian forces struggled to regroup or reestablish a coherent line of defense. Momentum shifted decisively. On November 8, Azerbaijani forces captured the strategically and culturally significant city of Shusha. Two days later, on November 10, Russia brokered a ceasefire that brought the war to an end.
The Battle of Hadrut is a reminder that the outcome of a war can turn not just on who has more soldiers or better weapons, but also on where and how each side chooses to fight. In urban warfare, failing to defend the urban area is often the same as choosing to lose it.
Liam Collins, PhD was the founding director of the Modern War Institute at West Point and a distinguished military fellow with the Middle East institute. He is a retired Special Forces colonel with deployments to Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, the Horn of Africa, and South America, with multiple combat operations in Fallujah in 2004. He is coauthor of Understanding Urban Warfare and author of Leadership & Innovation During Crisis: Lessons from the Iraq War.
John Spencer is chair of urban warfare studies at the Modern War Institute, codirector of MWI’s Urban Warfare Project, and host of the Urban Warfare Project Podcast. He served twenty-five years as an infantry soldier, which included two combat tours in Iraq. He is the author of the book Connected Soldiers: Life, Leadership, and Social Connections in Modern War and coauthor of Understanding Urban Warfare.
The article was by published by the Modern War Institute as part of the Urban Warfare Project's Case Study Series.
