Since taking office in 2019, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has embarked on a complex reorientation of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy, including in regard to the country’s strategic dual engagement with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Kazakhstan, under its first president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, played a crucial role as the architect and promoter of Eurasian integration, Nazarbayev not only initiated the Eurasian Economic Union but also shaped its ideological framework around regional stability and post-Soviet cooperation.
Unlike his predecessor, Tokayev’s foreign policy marks a calibrated shift that emphasizes national sovereignty, economic pragmatism, and diversified multilateral alignments beyond the Russia-China axis. This strategic realignment is evidenced by his restrained rhetoric on Eurasianism, increased outreach to Western and Asia-Pacific partners, and cautious engagement with regional blocs to avoid overdependence on dominant powers, The Caspian Post reports citing The Diplomat.
In addition, Kazakhstan under Tokayev is positioning itself as a leader in a transition from integrationist ambition to geopolitical hedging. Kazakhstan is signaling more technocratic and adaptive foreign policy to navigate an evolving regional and global landscape, ensuring its relevance and adaptability in a period marked by rapid geopolitical tensions. Tokayev’s administration has strategically expanded multilateral cooperation while reaffirming sovereignty amid the Ukraine crisis, in particular.
Eurasian Multilateralism Under Nazarbayev
The initial step toward what would eventually be called the Eurasian Union (EAU) was proposed by Nazarbayev during a lecture at Moscow State University on March 29, in 1994. Nazarbayev emphasized the need for integration and state-building in the post-Soviet space. He highlighted two key areas for such a union: a defense coalition via the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and substantial economic integration.
Consequently, the Custom Union Treaty, which was signed in 2015 by Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia, sought to remove trade barriers and enhance competition among member states; however, its effectiveness was hindered by the political and economic landscape of the 1990s. The agreement laid the foundation for free movement among the participating countries, eventually extending to include Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The establishment of the Eurasian Economic Community in 2000 signified a shift toward a more organized model of integration. By 2015, the framework for the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) was officially introduced, advancing Nazarbayev’s initial vision and incorporating additional members, specifically Armenia and Kyrgyzstan.
The role of Kazakhstan in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), meanwhile, was facilitated, after its foundation in 2001, by enhancing security cooperation, regional stability, and economic integration among its members, which included Kazakhstan, China, Russia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan as well as Uzbekistan. Nazarbayev viewed the SCO as a platform to balance Kazakhstan’s multivector foreign policy between two regional global powers, Russia and China. This dual focus on security and economic cooperation within the organization aligned with Kazakhstan’s strategic interests in navigating its role as a mediator and promoter of peace and stability in Central Asia.
Tokayev Takes the Helm
Under Tokayev, who took up the presidency in 2019, Kazakhstan in the EAEU has become more strategic - heightening focus on resilience and national sovereignty. Analysts suggest that Tokayev’s strategy seeks to enhance Kazakhstan’s economic interests within a multilateral framework rather than solely aligning with Russian policies. In other words, Tokayev’s use of multilateralism is a functional, sovereignty-oriented recalibration of Kazakhstan’s external strategy, moving away from Nazarbayev’s ideologically driven Eurasianism toward a diplomacy that prioritizes strategic buffering over symbolic alignment. In addition, under Tokayev, Kazakhstan’s role in the EAEU has evolved with the shifting geopolitical landscape shaped by rising tensions between Russia and Western nations due to the war in Ukraine.
The war in Ukraine necessitated a careful diplomatic approach, with Kazakhstan asserting its neutral position and positioning itself as a mediator and peacekeeper. In this context, Tokayev has adopted a pragmatic and technocratic diplomatic posture, characterized by strict adherence to United Nations principles of territorial integrity and non-aggression, while carefully avoiding alignment with Russia’s strategic narratives. Unlike Nazarbayev, who avoided criticism of Russian military actions in Georgia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014, Tokaeyev has demonstrated a strong diplomatic posture, presenting a shift in style that nevertheless has substance. Tokayev, for example, declined to recognize separatist regions, including those in Ukraine that Russia has claimed, during the St. Petersburg Forum in 2022: “We do not recognize Taiwan, Kosovo, South Ossetia, or Abkhazia. This principle will also apply to quasi-state territories such as Dontesk and Lugansk.”
Under Tokayev, Kazakhstan’s engagement within the SCO reflects a shift from the symbolic Eurasian alignment under Nazarbayev to a pragmatic, sovereignty-conscious multilateralism. While Nazarbayev framed the SCO as a geopolitical platform reinforcing Kazakhstan’s Eurasian identity and balancing between Russia and China, Tokayev focuses on practical cooperation rather than symbolic leadership. He has instrumentalized the organization to expand Kazakhstan’s role as a transport and logistics hub connecting China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) with Europe.
Under Tokayev, the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), widely known as the Middle Corridor, has been promoted as a cornerstone of Kazakhstan’s economic and foreign strategy. While initial planning of the corridor predates his presidency, Tokayev has significantly expanded its role as part of his technocratic and pragmatic shift toward infrastructure-led diplomacy. This East-West trade route connects China to Europe via Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, and Turkiye, offering a non-Russian alternative to Eurasian trade, especially following the outbreak of the Russian-Ukraine war in 2022.
Under Tokayev, Kazakhstan has displayed a notably warmer and more proactive engagement with China, especially in the realms of trade and infrastructure. Tokayev has deepened ties with Beijing through direct alignment with China’s BRI and increased high-level exchanges, while publicly distancing Kazakhstan from Russia’s more aggressive geopolitical posture. Moreover, Tokayev reinforced Kazakhstan’s economic alignment with China, praising the BRI and proposing Kazakhstan as a trusted bridge between East and West. This reflects his technocratic and sovereignty-first posture within the SCO, leveraging the platform to advance national interests in a multipolar context rather than endorsing collective security matters.
Tokayev’s emerging foreign policy doctrine marks an evolution for Kazakhstan toward a pragmatic multilateralism rooted in neutrality, diversification, and the country’s place as a regional hub. The ongoing efforts to manage regional tensions, enhance economic collaboration, and assert Kazakhstan’s identity on the global stage reflect Tokayev’s strategic vision. Under his leadership, Kazakhstan’s role in multilateral bodies like the SCO and EAEU have evolved from symbolic participation to strategic positioning. By fostering cooperation with primary partners and maintaining an independent national approach, Kazakhstan under Tokayev is reshaping its geopolitical landscape and establishing its relevance in a multipolar world.
