For most of the post-Soviet period, Russia effectively remained the principal supplier of weapons and military technology to the countries of Central Asia. This position was based not only on Moscow’s political influence. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan inherited Soviet aircraft, armored vehicles, artillery, air defense systems, maintenance infrastructure and military training standards after the collapse of the USSR.

That made Russian weaponry the natural choice for decades. Purchasing new Russian equipment did not require a complete restructuring of the existing military system.

Today, however, that model is gradually changing.

China, long viewed in Central Asia primarily as a trade and investment partner, is moving increasingly into the defense and security market. Beijing is supplying drones, transport aircraft, armored vehicles and air defense systems, financing border security infrastructure and expanding cooperation with regional security agencies.

The most discussed example today is Uzbekistan and reports of a possible acquisition of Chinese Chengdu J-10CE fighter jets.

In July and August 2026, specialized media and OSINT analysts circulated reports suggesting that Tashkent may already have received four J-10CE aircraft and that a potential agreement could involve as many as 24 fighters. Neither Uzbekistan nor China has officially confirmed those reports, so it would be premature to present the deal as an established fact. (eurasianet.org)

Yet the significance of the story goes far beyond whether Chinese fighter jets are already operating from Uzbek airfields.

Even the discussion of such a contract reflects a deeper trend: Central Asia’s defense market is no longer an arena of almost unquestioned Russian dominance.

And this process began long before 2026.

From Soviet Legacy to Multiple Suppliers

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia enjoyed enormous structural advantages in Central Asia.

The region’s armed forces operated Soviet MiG-29 and Su-27 fighters, Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters, T-72 tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery and air defense systems.

Switching to a completely different technological platform was expensive and complicated.

Buying a Western or Chinese aircraft, for example, means far more than simply purchasing the plane itself. It requires retraining pilots and engineers, building new maintenance systems, acquiring new ammunition and restructuring logistics and infrastructure.

That is why Russia benefited for so long from the effect of an already existing military ecosystem.

But gradually, the countries of the region began to diversify.

One of the first serious competitors to emerge was China’s defense industry.

photo: getty images

Uzbekistan: China Has Been Present for Years

The J-10CE story may create the impression that China is only now entering the Uzbek market. In reality, defense cooperation began much earlier.

Uzbekistan was among the first Central Asian states to show interest in Chinese Wing Loong armed drones in the first half of the 2010s.

More importantly, cooperation later expanded into air defense.

China supplied Uzbekistan with the FD-2000, the export version of the HQ-9 air defense system. Open-source reporting has also referred to other Chinese air defense platforms in Uzbek service. Studies of China’s growing regional security role have repeatedly cited the FD-2000 delivery as one of the clearest examples of Beijing’s move into more sophisticated weapons categories. (doi.org)

This is strategically important.

A drone can be treated as a relatively isolated system. A modern air defense network is much more complex. It requires radars, command posts, missiles, communications systems, training and long-term servicing.

In other words, China had already begun entering those parts of Uzbekistan’s military structure that had historically been dominated by Soviet and Russian technology.

If the J-10CE acquisition is eventually confirmed, that would represent a qualitative leap.

A modern fighter creates long-term dependence on the supplier for missiles, spare parts, engines, software, upgrades and pilot training.

That is why a potential Chinese fighter deal would have strategic consequences far beyond the value of the contract itself.

Kazakhstan: Chinese Drones and Transport Aircraft

Kazakhstan provides another revealing example.

Astana remains one of the Central Asian states most deeply connected to Russia in security terms. Kazakhstan is a member of the CSTO, a large share of its military equipment is of Russian or Soviet origin, and military-technical ties with Moscow remain extensive.

Yet Kazakhstan was also among the early adopters of significant Chinese military hardware.

The Kazakh armed forces acquired Chinese Wing Loong-1 armed drones. In addition, Chinese Y-8F-200 military transport aircraft entered service with Kazakh security structures.

In 2018, Kazakhstan and Shaanxi Aircraft Corporation concluded an agreement covering the acquisition of eight Y-8F-200W transport aircraft. The first aircraft arrived that same year, with further deliveries continuing afterward. (informburo.kz)

Again, the importance lies not only in the number of aircraft.

Kazakhstan demonstrated that it was willing to introduce large Chinese aviation platforms despite decades of reliance on the Soviet-Russian aviation school.

This does not mean Astana is abandoning Moscow. Kazakhstan continues to operate Russian Su-30SM fighters and many other Russian systems.

A more accurate description is defense diversification.

For Kazakhstan, the logic is straightforward: the more suppliers it has, the less vulnerable it is to dependence on any single state.

Turkmenistan: China Has Long Challenged Russia in Air Defense

Perhaps the most underappreciated example of China’s military presence is Turkmenistan.

Ashgabat began purchasing Chinese air defense systems earlier than many of its neighbors.

Open-source reporting indicates that Turkmenistan acquired Chinese HQ-9 long-range air defense systems, HQ-12 medium-range systems, as well as other air defense and radar equipment.

The Wilson Center estimated a 2016 contract involving HQ-9 and HQ-12 systems at around $230 million. (5g.wilsoncenter.org)

Turkmen forces have also displayed Chinese drones, including the CH-3A, along with other Chinese-made systems. (regnum.ru)

This matters because air defense is one of the most sensitive elements of national security.

A country buying such systems from a foreign supplier effectively allows that supplier to become part of the architecture protecting its national airspace.

The fact that China secured such positions in Turkmenistan shows that the erosion of Russia’s monopoly started well before the war in Ukraine.

photo: getty images

Tajikistan: China Enters Through Border Security

In Tajikistan, Beijing’s strategy has taken a somewhat different form.

Russia remains Dushanbe’s principal external military partner. Carnegie has estimated that more than 90% of the weapons transferred to Tajikistan since independence have been connected to Russia. (carnegieendowment.org)

Even so, China has steadily secured positions in specific niches.

The Tajik armed forces have received Chinese Norinco VP11 armored vehicles, CS/VN3 light armored vehicles, China Tiger armored cars, self-propelled mortar systems and small arms. Some of this equipment has been displayed during military parades in Dushanbe. (janes.com)

But China’s activities along the Afghan border are even more significant.

Beijing has financed the construction and development of security facilities in Tajikistan. Several studies have reported a Chinese presence near the Wakhan Corridor and infrastructure in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region close to Afghanistan and the Chinese border. The exact status of these facilities has been interpreted differently, so it would be inaccurate to describe them unambiguously as a formal Chinese military base. (osw.waw.pl)

Still, the trend is clear: China is becoming not only a supplier of equipment but also a participant in the region’s border security infrastructure.

The logic is straightforward.

For Beijing, instability in Afghanistan poses risks to Xinjiang as well as to Chinese investments and transport corridors across Central Asia.

The Tajik case therefore demonstrates how far China’s strategy has moved beyond conventional arms sales.

Kyrgyzstan: Military Aid and Training

Kyrgyzstan is not yet a major buyer of sophisticated Chinese weapons.

Russia still holds a very strong position there, including through the Kant air base.

Nevertheless, China has for years provided Bishkek with equipment, vehicles, communications systems and other forms of assistance to the armed forces and law enforcement agencies.

Carnegie has noted that after the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Beijing began providing military and security assistance to Kyrgyzstan on a regular basis. China supplied vehicles, communications equipment and other hardware, while Chinese institutions also trained Kyrgyz security personnel. (assets.carnegieendowment.org)

Individually, these programs cannot be compared with fighter or air defense contracts.

But they serve another objective: gradually building institutional relationships with the country’s security structures.

Over time, those relationships can be just as important as direct arms sales.

This Is No Longer a Series of Isolated Deals

Taken together, the picture across all five Central Asian states is much more significant.

In Kazakhstan, China is present in drones and transport aviation.

In Uzbekistan, it is active in drones and air defense, while the possible move into fighter aviation is now being discussed.

In Turkmenistan, China has established a foothold in air defense, radar technology and drones.

In Tajikistan, it is present in armored vehicles, border infrastructure and security assistance.

In Kyrgyzstan, it is active in military aid, equipment and personnel training.

China is therefore gradually entering almost every major layer of Central Asia’s defense architecture.

The process is not uniform and is not occurring at the same speed in every country.

But the direction is increasingly clear.

The War in Ukraine Accelerated the Shift

Another major factor is the sharp decline in Russian arms exports.

According to SIPRI, exports of major Russian weapons in 2021-2025 fell by 64% compared with 2016-2020. Russia’s share of global arms exports dropped from 21% to 6.8%. (sipri.org)

The reasons are not limited to the war in Ukraine, but the conflict has clearly played a major role.

Russia’s defense industry is under enormous pressure to meet domestic military demand. At the same time, sanctions have complicated access to some components and technologies.

This does not mean the Russian defense industry is incapable of producing weapons. On the contrary, SIPRI has recorded rising revenues among major Russian defense companies amid strong domestic demand. (sipri.org)

But priorities have changed.

Moscow must first supply its own armed forces.

For foreign customers, this raises questions about delivery schedules, availability of platforms, maintenance and long-term servicing.

China benefits from that uncertainty.

photo: Journal of Democracy

Beijing Is No Longer Selling Only Cheap Alternatives

There is also a technological reason for China’s rise.

Two decades ago, Chinese weapons were often seen mainly as lower-cost alternatives to Russian or Western systems.

That perception is outdated.

China now produces modern fighters, long-range air defense systems, missiles, armed drones, armored vehicles and advanced radar platforms.

According to SIPRI, China remains one of the world’s five largest suppliers of major arms. (sipri.org)

For Central Asian states, there is another advantage.

Defense cooperation with Beijing can be integrated into a much broader economic relationship.

China is already one of the largest trading partners of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.

In the first half of 2026 alone, trade between China and Uzbekistan reached about $7.7 billion, according to Uzbek data. (eurasianet.org)

Arms deals therefore become part of a much wider strategic partnership.

Russia Remains the Main Military Actor

It would nevertheless be wrong to claim that China has already displaced Russia from Central Asia.

Moscow retains enormous advantages.

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan remain members of the CSTO.

Russia maintains military facilities in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

Much of the region’s military inventory is still Soviet or Russian.

Thousands of officers have been trained in Russian military institutions.

Moreover, switching from one military ecosystem to another takes decades.

Even if a country buys Chinese aircraft, that does not mean it will immediately abandon Russian platforms.

For many years, Central Asian armies are likely to operate mixed fleets of Russian, Chinese, Turkish and domestically produced equipment.

Türkiye Is Another Competitor

China is also not the only new player.

Türkiye’s role has expanded significantly in recent years.

Turkish drones, armored vehicles and other defense technologies are increasingly visible across the region. The Organisation of Turkic States also provides a political framework for deeper defense cooperation.

The future Central Asian defense market is therefore unlikely to be divided simply between Moscow and Beijing.

A multi-polar market is emerging, involving Russia, China, Türkiye and domestic defense industries.

This is fundamentally different from the situation in the 1990s and 2000s.

Why This Matters Geopolitically

Arms sales are not ordinary commercial transactions.

A modern fighter can remain in service for 30 to 40 years.

An air defense system can operate for decades.

Throughout that period, the customer requires missiles, spare parts, repairs, modernization, software and training.

Every major contract therefore creates long-term technological and political ties.

That is why competition for Central Asia’s defense market has geopolitical significance.

Beijing does not necessarily need to establish large military bases across the region to expand its influence.

It may be enough to become embedded in the military infrastructure of Central Asian states.

If a country operates Chinese fighters, Chinese air defense systems and Chinese drones, its strategic relationship with Beijing automatically becomes deeper.

Central Asia Is Choosing the Freedom to Choose

The current trend should not be interpreted simply as an anti-Russian turn.

Kazakhstan and especially Uzbekistan have consistently pursued multi-vector foreign policies.

Their objective is not to replace dependence on Russia with dependence on China.

It is to reduce dependence on any single supplier.

That is why they are simultaneously expanding ties with China, Türkiye, European countries and their own domestic defense industries.

Central Asia is becoming a more autonomous geopolitical actor.

Regional governments can now compare prices, technologies and political conditions offered by several suppliers and use that competition to negotiate better terms.

That is perhaps the most serious challenge for Russia.

photo: visa express

Russia Is Losing Not the Market, but the Monopoly

The claim that China is “pushing Russia out” therefore requires some qualification.

Russia still holds strong positions and will remain one of the principal military and political actors in Central Asia for the foreseeable future.

But it is gradually losing something it possessed for three decades: the status of an almost unavoidable supplier.

And this trend is no longer based on a single potential contract.

Kazakhstan has acquired Chinese drones and transport aircraft. Uzbekistan operates Chinese air defense systems and is being discussed as a potential J-10CE customer. Turkmenistan has long operated Chinese air defense systems and drones. Tajikistan has received Chinese armored vehicles and security infrastructure. Kyrgyzstan has expanded ties with Chinese security structures and received military assistance.

None of these examples individually represents a strategic defeat for Russia.

Together, however, they indicate a structural shift.

For decades, a rough division of labor prevailed: China was the economic power, while Russia remained the security power.

That formula is now breaking down.

China remains Moscow’s biggest economic competitor in the region, but it is also moving deeper into security and defense.

As a result, a new model is emerging in which Central Asia works simultaneously with several major powers.

And if reports of J-10CE deliveries to Uzbekistan are eventually confirmed, they will become a symbol of that transition: Chinese systems will have moved from supporting roles directly into one of the most prestigious and strategically important sectors - modern combat aviation.

At that point, the main question will no longer be whether China can compete with Russia in Central Asia’s defense market.

It already does. The real question is how far that competition will go over the next decade.

By Tural Samedov