In recent years, the South Caucasus has become a focal point for increasing interaction between China and the region’s three countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. While Beijing’s engagement with Georgia and Azerbaijan was limited following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the late 2010s witnessed a shift driven by geopolitical changes and economic opportunities. This shift became particularly evident after the outbreak of war in Ukraine in February 2022.
China’s growing interest in the South Caucasus aligns with its broader Eurasian strategy, where the region plays a crucial role in the expanding Middle Corridor-a multimodal trade route connecting China to the European Union via Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, and the Black Sea. The need to diversify trade routes, accelerated by Russia's invasion of Ukraine, has disrupted traditional routes transiting Russian territory. Additionally, ongoing shipping challenges in the Red Sea have underscored the strategic importance of the South Caucasus as the shortest link between China and Europe.
However, this does not mean that major global shipping companies have abandoned the Russian or Red Sea routes entirely. Instead, they have grown increasingly wary of the potential risks posed by instability along these routes. As is often the case with global commerce, diversification of trade routes is actively pursued. From this perspective, China’s shifting attitude toward the South Caucasus and the Middle Corridor gains clarity.
In September 2024, Georgia signed a memorandum of understanding with China to enhance bilateral trade and infrastructure development, while Azerbaijan joined a venture aimed at facilitating smoother cargo movement from China to the EU. These agreements build on earlier partnerships, such as a strategic infrastructure initiative between China and Azerbaijan in July 2024 and Georgia’s strategic partnership agreement with China in 2023, which paved the way for Chinese investment in the Anaklia deep-sea port on Georgia’s Black Sea coast. This project is poised to position Georgia as a critical hub along the Middle Corridor.
China’s increasing presence in the South Caucasus coincides with broader geopolitical shifts in the region. Both Georgia and Azerbaijan are now pursuing multivector foreign policies, seeking to balance relationships between Western and non-Western powers.
For Georgia, this approach includes strengthening ties with Türkiye and expressing interest in improving relations with Iran. However, Georgia remains cautious about aligning with organizations like BRICS+ or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). In contrast, Azerbaijan has taken more decisive steps to diversify its alliances, applying to join BRICS+ and seeking to elevate its status within the SCO. These moves reflect Azerbaijan’s broader strategy of engaging with what Eurasian powers term a multipolar world order and reducing reliance on Western powers.
This pivot toward Eurasian powers has come at the expense of traditional ties with the West, particularly for Georgia. Despite retaining EU candidate status, Georgia has recently questioned key aspects of its partnerships with the EU and NATO. Western financial aid to Georgia has declined, and NATO has refrained from reaffirming its 2008 commitment to Georgian membership. Tbilisi’s bilateral ties with the EU and the US have noticeably weakened. While both sides are likely to avoid a complete breakdown in relations, significant improvement in the near term appears unlikely.
Azerbaijan, while never aspiring to EU or NATO membership, has also experienced tensions with Western powers. Relations with the EU, especially with France, have been strained, with French accusations that Baku has interfered in French territories in the Pacific Ocean.
China’s growing influence in the South Caucasus reflects a broader transformation in the region’s geopolitical dynamics. The South Caucasus is no longer defined solely by the West-Russia rivalry but has become a space actively contested by multiple major powers. The rise of multivectorism offers countries like Georgia, Azerbaijan, and even, to some extent, Armenia an opportunity to diversify their foreign relations and leverage partnerships with both Western and Eurasian actors.
This trend is likely to accelerate, particularly if the United States, under Donald Trump’s leadership, prioritizes the Indo-Pacific region over the wider Black Sea region and West Asia overall. For Georgia and Azerbaijan, the current geopolitical climate provides an opportunity to solidify their roles as key players in Eurasian connectivity amid growing signs of a shift toward a multipolar international order.
