Uzbekistan has emerged as Central Asia's leader in military spending, raising questions about the reasons behind this increase. This shift also warrants attention from Uzbekistan's Central Asian neighbors.
According to Global Firepower’s 2025 Military Strength ranking, Uzbekistan’s defense budget was a little more than $2.8 billion, ahead of Kazakhstan which spent just over $2 billion, The Caspian Post reports citing The Times of Central Asia.
Kazakhstan still ranked ahead of Uzbekistan in overall military strength, 57th and 58th, respectively, but in 2024, Global Firepower ranked Kazakhstan 58th and Uzbekistan 65th.
Voice of America noted in a July 2024 report that military spending was generally increasing across Central Asia, a “development officials link to regional conflicts such as the war in Ukraine.”
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan boosted their military spending after they fought brief but destructive battles against each at the end of April 2021, and again in mid-September 2022. In March 2023, Kamchybek Tashiyev, the head of Kyrgyzstan’s security service, said that since the 2021 conflict, his country had spent some $1 billion on military equipment, including military drones from Turkey.
Global Firepower’s 2025 report stated that Kyrgyzstan spent $221.8 million and Tajikistan $446 million on defense in 2024.
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are the poorest countries in Central Asia.
Where is the Threat?
Uzbekistan and more broadly Central Asia’s increase in defense spending raise the question of why is it necessary.
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan’s surge in military spending was a reaction to the border conflicts of 2021 and 2022. The root cause of that fighting was disputed territories along their frontier, but this year the two countries finally signed a delimitation agreement and relations have improved.
The Central Asian states have legitimate security concerns, most emanating from Afghanistan, though not necessarily from the Taliban. Despite occasional saber-rattling, the Taliban are unlikely to ever try to attack or invade any Central Asian country, and presently most of the Central Asian states have established an amiable business relationship with the Taliban.
Militant groups operating in Afghanistan are the major concern.
These groups based in Afghanistan are the main threats to the Central Asian governments and require the Central Asian states to develop counter-terrorism capabilities, something they have been doing since the late 1990s. The anti-aircraft systems and missiles the Central Asian states, including Uzbekistan, are purchasing are ill-suited to counter-terrorism operations.
The timing of the significant increase in military spending came not long after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in late February 2022. Several Russian politicians and political commentators have spoken of reclaiming part of all of Kazakhstan in particular, but Uzbekistan has also been mentioned lately.
It would be understandable for Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to bolster their defenses in case the day comes when Russia looks to forcibly reincorporate Central Asia back into its empire. But Russia is listed second on Global Firepower’s ranking of military powers and the country’s defense budget in 2024 was some $126 billion. Without outside assistance, it is unlikely Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan could hold out for long against a determined Russian military assault.
The same is true when looking at Central Asia’s eastern neighbor, China, which is ranked third on the Global Firepower list and spent a whopping $266.85 billion on defense in 2024.
Regional Superpower
There is something of an arms race underway in Central Asia, and that is driving all five states to increase their defense budgets. Uzbekistan has good relations with all its immediate Central Asian neighbors, including Afghanistan, so there is no discernible threat that would compel the country to boost military spending.
One possible explanation is that Uzbekistan is once again looking to become Central Asia’s military superpower.
Uzbekistan’s first president, Islam Karimov, pursued such a policy. He envisioned a Central Asia with as little Russian military presence as possible and worked to make Uzbekistan’s army the dominant force in the region. Unfortunately for Uzbekistan’s neighbors, the cantankerous Karimov often intimidated or insulted their leadership, making Uzbekistan’s growing military power an ominous development.
For a variety of reasons, including financial and the unforeseen rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan that required courting Russian security assurances, the aim of being a regional policeman went unrealized.
Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev can take credit for the new spirit of regional cooperation in Central Asia today. When he came to power in late 2016 after Karimov’s death, Mirziyoyev made improving Uzbekistan’s tattered ties with its neighbors one of his first priorities. He succeeded to the point where Central Asian unity is helping mitigate past dependences on Russia, including for security guarantees.
In the future, Uzbekistan, alongside Kazakhstan, could provide a solid military foundation for regional forces. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, by far the two biggest countries in Central Asia, have strengthened military and security cooperation since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In 2024, the two countries conducted the Hanjar (Dagger) joint exercises in November, and the Hamkorlik (Cooperation) joint exercises in October, and in 2023, the Hanjar exercises in August, and the Qalqon (Shield) drills in May.
The two countries could be looking toward a day when their neighboring Central Asian countries call for Kazakh-Uzbek help instead of Russian aid if there is an internal or regional security problem. None of the countries in Central Asia are anxious to call for Russian troops to arrive in large numbers unless it is the only way to avoid some sort of catastrophic defeat. Given the current sentiment in the Kremlin, those Russian troops might stay in Central Asia. Being able to depend on security assistance from strong cultural cousins would likely be infinitely preferable to requesting help from a former colonizer.
One other possibility for Uzbekistan’s recent push to expand its military potential involves long-term strategy. Uzbekistan has the largest population in Central Asia, more than 37 million people, or nearly half of Central Asia’s total population.
Global Firepower’s rankings put Uzbekistan’s number of military personnel at an estimated 60,000 (not including security and interior ministry forces, and border guards), but notes the number of people “fit for service” is nearly 16 million. Tajikistan’s total population was nearly 10.5 million at the start of 2025, Kyrgyzstan’s was some 7.3 million, and Turkmenistan’s was just over 7 million, according to the Turkmen government’s official statistics, which are widely suspected of being greatly inflated.
Again, Uzbekistan’s relations with all its neighbors are better now than at perhaps any time previously in the country’s nearly 34-year history. But Uzbekistan’s relations with its neighbors were not always good and often in the past Uzbekistan was at odds with two or more of those neighbors at the same time. That is something none of the other Central Asian governments are likely to have forgotten.
These are uncertain geopolitical times in many areas of the world and many countries are upping their purchases of weapons. Central Asia is no exception, and with better reason than many as Central Asia borders China, Russia, Iran, and Afghanistan.
However, when the most populous Central Asian country, which in the recent past has exhibited signs of aiming for military dominance in the region, begins to spend more on its military than any of its neighbors, it cannot help but raise a few eyebrows.
