Somalia's political crisis deepened in May 2026 when the government unilaterally extended its expired mandate, prompting the opposition to reject it and call for protests. By June, political turmoil escalated into violent clashes, leading to international intervention. Türkiye led efforts to stop the violence that erupted in Mogadishu on June 3-4 and has since joined a four-member mediation team that includes the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union and the United Nations.

Mediation talks began with the U.S. Charge d'Affaires and the British Ambassador, followed by the involvement of the EU and the U.N. This Quartet, along with Türkiye, holds significant influence over Somalia's politics, as international donors finance over 60% of Somalia's budget through the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Somali groups have recognized Türkiye's desire to deepen bilateral relations. In addition to investments in security, oil exploration, the blue economy and a spaceport, Ankara has facilitated talks between Somalia and Somaliland and resolved the maritime access dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia through the Ankara Declaration.

Consequently, most competing Somali groups met with Ankara's mediation team. Many political actors recognize the alignment of interests between the two countries. However, given Türkiye's significant investments and stakes, Somalia's political leaders called for Ankara to be a neutral mediator and support a fair and competitive process for a smooth political transition. They also encouraged Ankara to broaden its engagement across Somalia’s political landscape and to ensure that its support is seen as constructive and impartial. In a letter to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, political leaders outlined three priorities: maintaining neutrality, broadening engagement, and ensuring that Türkiye’s support contributes to constructive political dialogue.

Key points of dispute

While the Quartet plus Türkiye has mediated between opposing sides, the rival parties have identified several contested points: the label of the transition process, the electoral system, the size of the constituency, the role of political parties, the election commission, and election security.

The government labels its proposal as "one person, one vote" (1P1V). It advocates for a party-based system, open-list proportional representation, a single countrywide constituency, an arbitrary proportional formula for translating votes into seats, and a unified election commission it appointed. Villa Somalia also argues that it is responsible for the security of the election.

In contrast, the opposition labels its proposal as "direct election." It seeks a candidate-based single-member plurality system, 275 constituencies in line with clan power-sharing in which each is separately contested, a first-past-the-post formula, and a two-tier election commission. Furthermore, the opposition demands a special arrangement to be negotiated on election security and the dispensation for the 57 legislators that represent Northern Dir clans.

But there is an important common ground that the government and opposition share. Both parties agree that seats will remain reserved for the sub-clans that have historically occupied them. The House of the People has 275 seats, and the Senate has 54. However, the agreement on clan power-sharing simplifies the analysis of the contested points.

The government's proposal for a single national constituency is not meaningful, as each seat is already reserved for a specific clan community. The government's call to use proportional representation in a single-member political district is a contradiction in terms. Single-member political districts use the first-past-the-post system, meaning the candidate who gets the most votes wins the seat.

Regarding the role of political parties, it is currently difficult to make effective use of them, given the important role that clan-based power-sharing continues to play in the political system. The government does not exercise full control across the country, and the absence of a population census presents additional challenges. In this context, the government’s proposal to use a formula for translating votes into seats, together with its intention to select representatives on behalf of clans, could raise concerns about the fairness and credibility of the electoral process.

In contrast, since all parliamentary seats are already reserved for clans, citizens should be allowed to vote directly for individual candidates from the community that historically held the seat, thereby ensuring accountability.

Furthermore, the two sides are at odds over the composition of the election commission. The government advocates for a unified commission, while the opposition favors a two-tier structure at the national and state levels. Given the limited time remaining, a single, inclusive election commission would be more efficient, as long as it is agreed on and it includes representatives from the government, opposition and civil society. States are either with the government or the opposition and will therefore be included.

Regarding the state elections, the government has already appointed the South-West and Galmudug administrations and is likely to do the same in Hir-Shabelle. The structural issues in these three states cannot be resolved in the remaining time. Therefore, the opposition should focus on the national elections for now.

Not to repeat civil war

Before concluding, it is worth reminding the quartet and Türkiye what led Somalia’s state to the crisis. The root cause of Somalia's civil war has been the competition for power and resources. In 1969, the military seized power, suspended the constitution, and banned political parties. This prompted opposition groups to cross the Ethiopian border to fight the government, ultimately leading to the civil war and the collapse of the state.

Today, there are parallels in the process. Therefore, mediators’ approaches to the 2026 political transition must take into account the costs of the civil war.

In conclusion, the Quartet and Türkiye, mediators in Somalia, wield significant leverage over the conflicting parties. In particular, Ankara is in a strong position as it has relationships with both the government and opposition. Therefore, the Quartet and Türkiye should pressure both parties to negotiate in good faith. The mediators must also support a competitive and fair process on a level playing field that respects the key political settlement of clan power-sharing and legitimizes the outcome of the dispensation.

Find the original article here