The summer of 2025 marked a turbulent period for Eurasia and Russian policy in the region. The ongoing military-political crisis surrounding Iran, if it escalates further, has the potential to significantly impact regional cooperation and international security.
Russia's relations with previously friendly Armenia, a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), are not getting any easier. Misunderstandings in relations between Russia and Azerbaijan are, of course, completely incomparable in scale with the crisis in the Middle East. However, they also indicate that the southern part of the Eurasian space is searching for its place in international politics, The Caspian Post reports citing foreign media.
The protracted military-political crisis in relations between Russia and the West, as well as the general uncertainty in the global economy and politics, have created conditions in which Moscow's neighbours are faced with both opportunities and serious challenges. It seems that the southern perimeter of Russia has come into motion, which may result in a change in the configuration of relations in this important space for Moscow. The fact that it is Russia that occupies a central place here and can make decisions that become the basis for others to take a fresh look at their strategy was symbolized by Moscow's recognition of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in early July 2025, where the Taliban movement came to power in 2021.
Eurasia, as the largest and most important region of the planet, remains at the centre of international politics and, at the same time, the object of attention from peripheral powers, including the United States - the strongest of them in military and economic terms. Moreover, at the western end of Eurasia there is a territorial enclave of the so-called Collective West, whose goals and priorities differ from almost all other countries in the region. In the Middle East, in addition to the very complex relations between regional powers, there is the factor of Israel, which also builds its foreign policy based on the American presence.
This means that the security situation in Eurasia is largely influenced by forces that are interested in it in the context of their diplomatic interactions, both with the largest Eurasian states - Russia, China and India, and with smaller powers like Iran, Saudi Arabia or Pakistan. For example, the efforts of Israel and the US behind it to further weaken Iran really do meet the interests of these countries: for the former, it is a matter of survival, and for the latter, it is a global struggle against Moscow and Beijing.
Obviously, if modern Iranian statehood turns out to be vulnerable to external pressure and internal difficulties, this will significantly increase the likelihood of chaos spreading across Central Asia. The latter, in turn, will create problems for Russia and China, which is, naturally, a strategic priority for the US under any circumstances.
Moreover, Russia's neighbours in the Caucasus and Central Asia are really currently in a state of searching for the most sustainable mechanisms for survival and development in conditions where traditional benchmarks are becoming much less reliable. As their political and economic systems continue to develop, new internal problems accumulate, often caused by achievements in integrating into the global economy. Almost all of them are already established states with stable functioning political systems and independent foreign policies. Moreover, in Central Asia, for example, in recent years we have been observing a process of progressive cooperation between five countries in the region, which may in the future lead to gaining additional subjectivity in international affairs. Russia fully supports this format and sees it as a promising factor in increasing the resilience of the entire region to external challenges and threats: the ability of its states to independently solve a number of important tasks.
At the same time, it is impossible to ignore the fact that in the near future, Russia's neighbours in the South will face new challenges.
First, the countries of the Caucasus will be, to one degree or another, vulnerable to threats emanating from their surroundings. It is difficult to say now how long the conflict between Israel and its neighbours will last and what new forms it will take. But there is little doubt that, thanks to this, the entire Middle East will remain a restless part of Greater Eurasia. Turkey's foreign policy, which sometimes takes on an adventuristic character, will also remain less predictable than we would like.
Second, individual countries, such as Azerbaijan or Kazakhstan, may face the problem of instability in the global energy market. Currently, the lion's share of their income comes from oil and gas exports. If this source is reduced, as a result of falling prices or the depletion of reserves, internal upheavals can be expected in the two countries.
Third, the countries of Central Asia will most likely face the problem of climate change and water shortages. For now, it is not dramatically acute. However, in combination with demographic growth, it may become so in the next decade.
Finally, the problem of the general negative influence of the increasingly unstable world politics and economy remains unresolved. But if large states have reserves to maintain stability, then medium-sized countries cannot always boast of this. The national governments of Russia's neighbours understand the severity of the probable challenges and are already energetically preparing to repel them. In part, this also becomes the reason for the need for a discussion on how relations between them and Russia should develop. This remains the centre of attention for almost all of its neighbours.
After all, strategically, relations between Russia and its neighbours from among the former republics of the USSR are determined by two main factors that enter into complex and contradictory relations with each other. First, Russia, due to its geographical size, resource endowment, economic potential and military-political power, remains the focal point of the entire "post-Soviet" space. Second, this space itself, as a certain civilizational integrity, is gradually eroding under the influence of the processes of formation and development of the sovereign statehood of the peoples that, at a certain historical stage, were part of the Russian Empire and the USSR.
Russia does not face the task of keeping its neighbours in its sphere of influence or ensuring a privileged political and economic position there. However, it is necessary that in the future the objective dependence of neighbours on Russia in various areas of development and security does not harm Russia's own interests. This means that the nature of political regimes in neighbouring countries is of no fundamental importance to us. It would be strategically risky to allow a situation to arise where they solve their development and security problems, including the domestic political consequences of these problems, at Russia's expense, without providing anything in return.
The solution to this problem can, as it seems, combine the inclusion of Russia's cooperation with neighbouring countries in the broader context of Eurasian joint development and, on the other hand, it’s a consistent and sufficiently firm strategy for ensuring, first and foremost, Russian interests. This approach equally applies to all three regions - Central Asia, Transcaucasia and Eastern Europe - affected by Russia’s policy in relations with neighbouring countries. But its practical implementation may be complicated by the established model of interaction, a serious revision of which looks like a too decisive step into an uncertain future.
