Donald Trump’s return to the U.S. presidency in 2025 sparked an intense debate on American foreign policy toward Central Asia, a region that has once again become a geopolitical crossroad. During Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s nomination hearing in January, he endorsed removing the Jackson-Vanik amendment on Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, to normalize relations with the Central Asian region.
These positive remarks, echoing long-running diplomatic complaints from Astana and Tashkent, kicked off optimistic analyses from regional analysts and foreign policy gurus who championed a recalibration of Central Asia’s role in relation to the United States amid the current tumultuous geopolitical era. Hopes rose that not only would Washington pay closer attention to Central Asia, but that trade could be used to build a bridge, The Caspian Post reports citing The Diplomat.
However, this optimism was short-lived. In April, the Trump administration unveiled its “reciprocal tariffs,” slapping a universal 10 percent tariff on almost every country with which the U.S. trades, including those in Central Asia, and a 27 percent tariff on Kazakhstan. In subsequent days, the tariffs were dialed back to 10 percent amid a 90-day review - a warning signal that economic coercion, not partnership, might define Washington’s new foreign and trade policy strategy, including toward Central Asia.
In a December 2024 analysis published by Daryo, I argued that trade and security would remain the main pillars of cooperation between Central Asia and the U.S. under Trump 2.0. In a more recent analysis, I warned that growing Central Asian trade relations with China, paired with Beijing’s gradual expansion into security cooperation, would be anathema to policymakers in Washington.
Both pundits and policymakers must avoid wishful thinking about a U.S. “return” to Central Asia. There are three structural reasons why U.S. policy under Trump will likely remain transactional, competitive, and limited in scope.
The U.S. foreign policy establishment has experienced a profound shift, starting with Trump’s first term in 2017. Trump’s worldview, which is rooted in Machiavellian philosophy and transactionalism, casts China as a revisionist power whose goal is to reshape the international order.
From his first term onward, Trump portrayed China-U.S. relations as a zero-sum game, where economic growth in Beijing translates into military power that would potentially threaten U.S. interests. Building on this view, China’s growing economic presence in Central Asia through trade, infrastructure, and investment might be interpreted not as development assistance but as strategic encroachment.
China’s exports to all five Central Asian countries have increased sharply, especially after 2020, amounting to a total growth of 136 percent over the 2020-2023 period. Kazakhstan remained the largest importer in the region of goods from China, while Kyrgyzstan recorded the fastest growth. The remaining countries of the region also saw their imports from China more than double. This rapid expansion in trade can be explained by the growth of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) infrastructure and trade networks and reflects China’s deepening interdependence with the region.
China’s relationships with Central Asia have long been dominated by economic concerns, but these relationships have begun to expand into the security domain, too. China has conducted military exercises with the Central Asian states, increased arms sales, and invested heavily in digital surveillance infrastructure. For instance, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have begun acquiring drones, air defense systems, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) from Beijing, with the purchase of JF-17 fighter jets also under consideration.
For policymakers in Washington, these developments are judged as clear evidence of Beijing’s strategic ambition to supersede Western influence in the region both economically and militarily.
This evolution poses a direct challenge to the United States, which lacks both the appetite and infrastructure to compete on equal terms with China in Central Asia. Thus, the Trump administration, rather than countering with deeper engagement or military commitments, is more likely to respond through economic pressure designed to raise the costs of aligning with China.
Another potential risk would be the region’s resources. Central Asia holds significant reserves of rare earth elements, lithium, cobalt, and other critical minerals essential for high-tech industries and green technologies. China has already secured long-term agreements with several regional states to mine and process these materials; Chinese companies have committed over $63 billion in investments across Central Asia, primarily targeting the mining and infrastructure sectors. China Mining Energy Group and Liamomaoli Metal Company are already involved in mining and processing projects across the region. Last but not least, in 2024, Kazakhstan and China signed a landmark agreement to build advanced copper smelting facilities, scheduled for completion by 2028.
The U.S., meanwhile, shares similar resource needs but lacks a comparable footprint in the region. As a result, competition over access to these resources will likely intensify.
Under Trump’s zero-sum approach, any significant expansion of Chinese control over strategic materials in Central Asia could prompt punitive economic measures from Washington, not with the aim of gaining influence, but rather to deny it to China. Due to the ongoing China-U.S. trade war, Beijing imposed export restrictions on key resources such as gallium, germanium, and graphite; currently, about 60 percent of critical raw materials is imported from China to the U.S.
To explore opportunities for increasing Central Asia’s involvement in global critical minerals supply chains, the U.S. Department of State launched the C5+1 Critical Minerals Dialogue (CMD) in 2024 under the Biden administration. Similarly, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) recommended in 2024 expanding global partnerships in critical minerals and rare earth elements to reduce dependency on China. In this regard, Central Asia stands out as a promising venue for establishing partnerships in the critical minerals sector; however, logistical difficulties might hinder such development.
Whereas the Biden administration leaned heavily on hopes for partnership, Trump’s style trends toward coercion. Neutrality, or a stance of equidistance, is likely to be viewed with skepticism by the Trump administration. Closer ties between China and Central Asia are not just economic relationships; they are strategic choices. The imposition of tariffs should therefore be read as a coercive signal: trading more with China will be interpreted as aligning with the United States’ geopolitical rival.
Countries in the region should prepare for a U.S. strategy that employs unilateral economic tools in the form of sanctions, tariffs, and trade restrictions designed to disrupt Chinese initiatives, even at the cost of economic instability in the region. This is unlikely to be accompanied by substantial U.S. investment or security guarantees, given the limits of American engagement and Russia’s long-standing role in the region.
One approach Central Asia could take is to double down on efforts toward regional integration and intra-regional trade. Additionally, increasing government expenditures on infrastructure projects have the potential to stimulate domestic industries and make national economics less vulnerable to shifting geopolitical dynamics. Finally, the leaders of Central Asia should act in concert to present the region as a platform for global cooperation, not a stage for great power competition. This can be done through using proactive diplomacy to shape the narrative, rather than waiting for others to impose their own.
The long-standing strategy of balancing relations between great powers, Central Asia’s so-called multi-vector diplomacy, has served the region quite well so far. But in the context of intensifying China-U.S. rivalry, this policy may be harder to sustain. Trump’s worldview does not leave much room for neutrality; it demands alignment or requires punishment.
Thus, the question remains: can Central Asian states continue their multi-vector diplomacy, or will they be forced to choose sides in this deepening geopolitical contest?
