The European Union is seeking to expand its presence in other parts of the world, even as Russia and the United States try to marginalise it in a resolution of the Ukraine war. In Central Asia, the 27-nation bloc is often seen as a partner that regional actors can use to balance their relations with China, The Caspian Post reports citing foreign media. But is there anything Brussels can offer that Beijing cannot? Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Central Asia remained in Moscow’s geopolitical and geoeconomic orbit for decades. Over the years, however, China has managed to position itself as the region’s leading trade partner, outpacing Russia in economic importance. In 2024, China’s overall turnover with Central Asia reached US$94.8 billion. In 2023, the world’s second largest economy replaced Russia as Kazakhstan’s biggest trade partner. It’s a similar story in neighbouring Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. In recent years, as a result of natural gas development, China has become the largest trading partner of energy-rich Turkmenistan. Although Ashgabat’s primary export market is China, Turkmenistan also aims to begin exporting gas to Europe. Therefore, it was unlikely to have been just a coincidence that Jozef Síkela, European Commissioner for International Partnerships, started his visit to Central Asia in Turkmenistan on March 12. While it remains unclear if natural gas was on the agenda, reports suggest that the Global Gateway - the EU’s infrastructure investment strategy - and the Trans-Caspian Middle Corridor would have been the major topics of discussion. Síkela visited the other Central Asian nations as well, probably in preparation for the upcoming EU-Central Asia summit scheduled for April 3 and 4 in Uzbekistan.
Amid the ongoing reconfiguration of the geopolitical order, the EU undoubtedly hopes to strengthen its economic and political ties with the region. But what are its goals in Central Asia?
According to Síkela, the primary objective of his recent trip was to “focus on key Global Gateway projects”. These include plans to invest in hydropower plants, modernise electricity grids and protect water resources by supporting glacier preservation initiatives.
More importantly, the EU is also strongly pushing for a Black Sea energy initiative. The idea is to create a corridor that will deliver green energy produced in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan via the Caspian Sea region to Europe.
But to achieve such an ambitious goal, the EU will have to invest a significant amount of money in Central Asian green energy infrastructure. China, on the other hand, is already investing billions in the region’s green energy transition, while the EU, as part of its Global Gateway strategy, aims to mobilise up to €300 billion (US$327 billion) in public and private investments by 2027.
The EU’s Global Gateway seems to be intended as a counterweight to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. However, while the Chinese strategy was developed over more than 10 years and consists of numerous coordinated plans and concepts, the European project, launched in 2021, is relatively young. As such, it also faces challenges internally and externally, whether it is the EU’s complex bureaucratic system or China’s proximity to Central Asia, which makes it a more financially attractive partner to regional actors. In spite of that, Brussels remains determined to get closer to Central Asia. This is why the development of the Trans-Caspian Middle Corridor is one of EU’s top priorities in Central Asia. The primary purpose of the project is to bypass Russia and connect Europe not only to Central Asia but also China. The interests of Beijing and Brussels seemed aligned when it comes to the development of the route also known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, which suggests the Belt and Road Initiative and the Global Gateway could be complementary, to a certain extent.
The EU is also interested in Central Asia’s critical raw materials, which is why it has signed strategic partnerships with a number of countries in the region. What could be a problem for European policymakers is the fact that China remains one of the major global buyers of Central Asia’s natural resources - thus, Beijing and Brussels might soon be competing in the strategically important region.
Nowhere is that more visible than in Kazakhstan, where France is eyeing an important role in the development of a nuclear sector for the largest Central Asian nation. Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s trip to Paris last week is proof that France has similar ambitions for the most populous country in Central Asia. Ahead of Mirziyoyev’s meeting with French President Emmanuel Macron, Uzbek state-owned enterprise Navoiyuran and French company Orano signed a cooperation agreement on uranium deposit development and the advancement of the uranium industry.
France, as well as the rest of the EU, is keen on securing uranium supplies from Central Asia. That is why the European Union aims to invest in the modernisation the Middle Corridor, fully aware that the route could play a key role in the export of uranium to Europe. Unsurprisingly, China also seeks access to the region’s uranium. Over the years, Beijing has invested heavily in infrastructure in Central Asia, whether through the Belt and Road Initiative or bilateral arrangements with regional countries.
We can expect to see in the coming months and years an intensification of competition for influence in Central Asia between the EU and China, and the region could become a critical focal point in the global power struggle.
