In normal circumstances, nations at war eventually come to the same table-first to negotiate a ceasefire, then to hammer out a political settlement that addresses the roots of their conflict.

But in the Iran war, there is a striking anomaly: Israel, a principal party to the fighting and a country many believe played a decisive role in shaping Washington’s decision to confront Tehran, is absent not only from ceasefire negotiations but also from the broader peace talks between the United States and Iran.

“For obvious reasons, any talks between Iran and Israel could be interpreted as direct or indirect recognition, and therefore would not be accepted by Iran. Sitting at the same table is out of the question,” Gokhan Batu, an Ankara-based expert on Israeli and Levant politics, tells TRT World.

Yet political history offers examples that complicate this logic.

There have been instances in which parties that did not formally recognise one another still negotiated and reached agreements. In fact, in most conflicts, all warring sides are ultimately represented, whether directly or indirectly, in both negotiations and final settlements.

During the Korean War, although Washington did not recognise the China-backed North Korean government, American military representatives nonetheless sat down with their counterparts and signed an armistice in the early 1950s.

A Chinese general was also among the signatories of the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement, which remains in force today despite the lack of a formal peace treaty.

American and North Korean representatives sign the Korean War armistice agreement at P’anmunjŏm, Korea, July 27, 1953.

Yet even since then, the United States has not fully recognised North Korea and still lacks formal diplomatic relations with Pyongyang.

In general political practice, when warring sides come together, even at a purely functional level, to agree to a cessation of hostilities, it signals a mutual willingness to end the conflict and to adhere to the terms of a ceasefire or eventual peace.

“Israel’s non-participation in US-Iran negotiations gives a political leverage to Tel Aviv to say that ‘We are not stopping to attack Iran because we are not party to this process’,” Kadir Temiz, director of Orsam, an Ankara-based Turkish research center, tells TRT World.

If Israel continues its attacks against Iran and its allies, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, while remaining outside the пеgotiation framework, it risks reinforcing a perception in Tehran that engagement with Washington cannot yield meaningful outcomes, according to Temiz.

More of the Same War

From this perspective, Israel’s absence from ceasefire and peace talks appears less accidental than deliberate, rooted in its pro-war posture and its potential to disrupt fragile diplomatic processes, according to experts.

“If the US and Iran really aim to reach an agreement, the pro-war Netanyahu government's presence in talks is not in the best interest of both states for both political and technical reasons, On the other hand, for Israelis, who see their involvement in a process they existentially oppose, negotiating with Iranians rather than fighting them doesn't seem reasonable,” Batu tells TRT World.

Other experts echo this view, arguing that Israeli participation might not facilitate progress but instead complicate an already delicate process and heighten tensions in high-stakes negotiations between the two adversaries.

Israel's Benjamin Netanyahu has recently visited occupying Israeli troops in southern Lebanon, signalling his warmonger attitude.

“Israel, which triggered the Iran war, would act like a spoiler, a political actor who is trying to make things more chaotic to prevent the realisation of a smooth negotiation ground,” says Temiz.

If Israel prefers a continuation of the conflict, the question then becomes whether it will seek to undermine the current ceasefire process, one that Trump has extended without a clear deadline, citing Pakistan’s mediation efforts.

“Yes, Israeli lobbying efforts are already underway in that direction, but the situation in the Gulf is quite problematic. Of course, Israel isn't the sole determining factor, although its influence is undeniable,” Batu responds, seeing an increasing likelihood that tensions might escalate into another round of fighting.

Temiz, for his part, sees only a slim chance of a lasting agreement between Washington and Tehran, arguing that Israel has shown little intention of ending the war, an outlook that suggests a prolonged phase of military confrontation.

“Tel Aviv doesn't want a return to the pre-war status quo”, which allows the current Iranian state to continue its influence internally and externally across the Middle East, continuing its nuclear programme, according to Batu.

In this reading, the Netanyahu government appears to calculate that such a moment may not come again, that Israel may not have another opportunity to wage what Batu describes as “a third war on Tehran,” given the strain such a conflict would place on both the region and the wider international system.

He points to the 12-day war in June and the subsequent escalations, which he characterises as a “40-day war”, as evidence of how quickly the situation has already intensified.

Despite two wars, Iran’s post-1979 revolutionary state remains intact, raising deeper questions about the coherence and endgame of Israel’s strategy towards Tehran and its regional allies, while fuelling growing criticism within Israel of the Netanyahu government’s conduct of the war.

“Between the 12-day war and the 40-day war, Iran seems to have recovered. If the regime doesn't collapse, it will recover again. A success story hasn't been written here yet,” Batu says, referring to the fact that the Netanyahu government could not create a good narrative on its war.

Mossad chief David Barnea initially framed Israel’s war objective not as the outright dismantling of the Iranian regime through military force, but as a sustained effort to weaken the state to the point of institutional dysfunction, creating conditions that could eventually trigger internal unrest in the aftermath of a US-Israel campaign.

Mossad chief David Barnea has plans for a regime change in Tehran if the war ends supposedly with a weakened Iran.

“The war is a tool for weakening the regime, but so far it has not yielded the desired result. Israel keeps its objective ambiguous in many of its operations. This allows for calibration of the main target. If the regime doesn't fall, they will say that they have significantly reduced its ballistic missile, nuclear, and other military infrastructure,” Batu tells TRT World.

“This ambiguity is used as leverage. Generally, there is no "B" or exit plan. This is a subject of great criticism as a political/military doctrine in many cases, but acting opportunistically is a tradition for Israel.”

Despite Israel’s continued war posture and its lobbying influence in Washington, analysts point to a growing wave of criticism within the United States directed at the Netanyahu government, as an increasing number of commentators question the rationale of engaging in military confrontations with countries like Iran in ways that appear closely aligned with Israeli priorities rather than clearly defined American interests.

A recent Wall Street Journal analysis, citing Trump administration officials, suggests that the US president has grown increasingly uneasy about the continuation of the Iran war-particularly amid mounting global political and economic repercussions and its potential impact on the approaching midterm elections.

“Ultimately, it is the evolving posture of the US-and its willingness to recognise shifting geopolitical realities-that will determine whether Israeli priorities continue to define Trump’s agenda, or whether a substantive shift in US foreign policy toward Iran and the broader Middle East is underway,” Ramzy Baroud, a Palestinian political analyst and writer, tells TRT World.

Does Anyone Represent Israel in US-Iran Talks?

The US delegation in the Iran negotiations included Vice President JD Vance, along with Trump administration mediators Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, both widely seen as close to pro-Israel circles and, according to some regional diplomats, perceived as “Israeli assets.”

Many analysts have long expressed doubts about the Witkoff-Kushner duo, questioning both their underlying motivations for engaging with Iranian counterparts and their capacity to navigate the technical complexities of issues such as Tehran’s uranium enrichment programme.

Baroud argues that Kushner and Witkoff, in fact, serve as effective representatives of Israeli interests in the US-Iran talks, given what he describes as their consistent alignment with the priorities of the Netanyahu government.

Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff, the two real estate dealers, were part of US-Iran peace talks in Islamabad.

“Since the beginning of Trump’s second term, their diplomatic and political efforts have functioned as a sustained campaign to defend Israel’s position and to secure, through political pressure presented as ‘diplomacy,’ what Israel has failed to achieve through its military campaigns, including the Gaza genocide,” he says.

But some analysts also see a financial interest in the Kushner-Witkoff duo’s mediation efforts. The US House has recently shown its interest by opening an investigation into whether Kushner’s mediation roles conflict with his investments from Gulf monarchies for his private business.

Among those analysts is Dan Steinbock, an international expert on geopolitics and global economics.

“Ostensibly, the two champion the US national interest. In practice, Kushner has multibillion-dollar financial ties to Gulf states, via his private equity firm Affinity Partners. Witkoff's ties are indirect, via business and diplomacy,” Steinbock tells TRT World.

“Their brand of Zionism is profit-driven,” he adds.

In contrast to many voices within the US foreign policy establishment who emphasise strong support for Israel, Steinbock offers a sharply different interpretation.

“It may be strange to some. But in my The Fall of Israel (2024), I argued that Israel is no longer sovereign,” Steinbock tells TRT World.

“Effectively, that's the price of the US military aid. Ultimately, the decisions on the future of Israel will first be made in the Pentagon.”

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