U.S. President Donald Trump’s statement that India has allegedly agreed to stop purchasing Russian oil should not be viewed as an isolated media episode. If translated into actual policy, it could signal a far deeper shift in the architecture of economic pressure surrounding Russia. The consequences would extend well beyond the energy market and directly affect Moscow’s ability to pursue its political and military objectives in the war against Ukraine.

Since 2022, India has become a cornerstone of Russia’s sanctions-adaptation strategy. After losing most of the European market, Russian crude found a massive alternative outlet in India, where refineries began purchasing large volumes at discounted prices. These flows formed the backbone of Russia’s wartime economic model, in which volume and continuity increasingly matter more than price.

The scale of this dependence is substantial.

In 2023, India imported up to 2.1-2.2 million barrels per day of Russian crude at peak levels, making Russia its single largest supplier.

photo: Reuters

In 2024, total Russian oil shipments to India reached approximately 87-88 million tons, accounting for about 36-37 percent of India’s overall oil imports.

In 2025, despite market fluctuations, Russian supplies to India remained high, averaging roughly 1.7-1.9 million barrels per day in several months, with Russia still covering more than 30 percent of Indian crude imports.

These volumes are not marginal. They are structural.

Russia’s wartime economic logic is simple but rigid: as long as export revenues remain sufficiently high and predictable, the state can finance a prolonged conflict. Once the revenue base begins to shrink, war shifts from a manageable process into an accelerating financial burden.

From this perspective, losing the Indian oil market would represent a systemic shock.

photo: Reuters

First, it would mean an immediate contraction of hard currency inflows into the Russian budget. Even if some volumes were redirected to other Asian buyers, this would almost certainly require even steeper discounts. Russia would be pushed further into the role of a price-taker, competing primarily through price cuts, leading to a structural erosion of its oil rent.

Second, a “double pressure” effect would intensify. Revenues would fall while costs rise. Long shipping routes, shadow fleet operations, insurance workarounds, sanctions-bypassing logistics, and financial intermediaries all increase transaction costs. A model based on shrinking margins and rising expenses becomes progressively fragile.

Yet the most important dimension is not purely economic - it is military.

The loss of the Indian oil market would harm Russia not only financially, but also directly undermine its capacity to achieve its desired political and military outcomes in Ukraine.

Russia’s war effort rests on a straightforward formula: the higher and more stable export revenues are, the longer the state can sustain combat operations, procure weapons, expand production, pay soldiers, and fund domestic compensation programs. Oil revenues sit at the center of this system.

photo: CNN

If the largest buyer of Russian crude sharply reduces or ends purchases, foreign currency inflows into the budget will tighten. At a time when Russian military expenditures have already reached record levels, any decline in revenue forces painful choices:

- cut civilian and social spending,

- increase borrowing and monetary emission, or

- slow military production and procurement.

All three options weaken Russia’s strategic position.

Cuts to social spending increase domestic pressure and gradually erode the implicit social contract underpinning political stability. Expanded borrowing and money printing accelerate inflation and undermine macroeconomic stability. Slower military production directly affects battlefield realities by limiting Russia’s ability to replace lost equipment, ammunition, and manpower.

This is where the link between India’s oil purchases and Moscow’s war strategy becomes explicit.

Russia has largely built its approach around a war-of-attrition model, betting that it can endure longer than Ukraine and longer than Western societies’ willingness to sustain financial and military support for Kyiv. That strategy presupposes relative economic resilience.

Losing its largest alternative oil market undermines that premise.

There is also a powerful geopolitical and psychological effect. India has been portrayed by the Kremlin as proof that major Global South powers are unwilling to align with Western pressure and prefer to pursue autonomous policies. If New Delhi begins distancing itself from Russian oil, it would send a signal to other states that cooperation with Moscow carries rising political and sanctions risks.

photo: The Caspian Post

This could trigger a gradual, informal retreat by additional buyers - even without formal participation in Western sanctions regimes.

In such a scenario, Russia’s room for maneuver would narrow faster than before: fewer markets, lower revenues, deeper dependence on a limited circle of partners, and weaker negotiating leverage.

For this reason, a potential Indian refusal to buy Russian oil should not be seen merely as the loss of a single customer. It would represent a blow to the financial foundation of Russia’s war effort.

And without a stable financial foundation, the capacity to sustain a long, expensive military campaign and impose favorable outcomes inevitably declines.

By Tural Heybatov