Iran's foreign policy, including its approach to the South Caucasus, is ultimately shaped by the Supreme Leader, who remains the sole decision-maker on foreign and domestic matters.
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The Caspian Post presents an exclusive interview with Shukriya Bradost. She is a non-resident scholar at the Middle East Institute, a contributor to The Washington Institute, and a PhD researcher in international security at Virginia Tech University, specializing in Middle East security. With over fifteen years of experience as a multimedia commentator, she has authored numerous articles for leading outlets, including The Jerusalem Post, Al Jazeera, The Washington Institute, and the Atlantic Council. In this insightful conversation, we discuss her perspectives on current developments in the Middle East, security challenges, and the evolving geopolitical landscape.
- How do you assess the strategy of the new Iranian leadership regarding the South Caucasus? What priorities, in your opinion, will determine Iran's policy in this region?
- Iran's foreign policy, including its approach to the South Caucasus, is ultimately shaped by the Supreme Leader, who remains the sole decision-maker on foreign and domestic matters. The selection of a so-called moderate or reformist president was aimed at easing sanctions through improved relations with the West, particularly the U.S., but growing tensions between Iran and Israel, along with Iran's continued military assistance to Russia, have rendered any rapprochement unlikely. Iran's reliance on Russia as the main ally in its war against the West limits Tehran's ability to oppose Russian policies in the South Caucasus region. Meanwhile, Russia's relationships with Turkey and Azerbaijan complicate the situation for Tehran. Russia prioritizes its ties with these countries, knowing that Iran has fewer options for strategic alliances. At the same time, other regional players can maneuver with different partners, shifting the balance of power through new coalitions and challenging Moscow's influence in the South Caucasus.
- How do you see the future of relations between Iran and Azerbaijan in the context of the changing geopolitical situation in the region? Are there prospects for strengthening or, conversely, worsening bilateral ties?
- Tensions between Tehran and Baku will likely persist due to several unresolved issues. One of the main factors is Azerbaijan's close relationship with Israel, which Iran perceives as a direct threat to its national security, given that Iran has long aimed to surround Israel with hostile neighbors but now finds Israel with an ally at its border. Additionally, Iran's sizeable Azeri-Turkish population, which shares ethnic ties with Azerbaijan, supports Baku against Iran's ally, Armenia, and the rise of ethno-nationalism among this population poses a challenge to Iran's dominant Persian identity. Moreover, Baku's close ties with Turkey further complicate the situation, as Ankara bypasses Tehran in their hegemonic rivalry, particularly after both lost influence in the Middle East to Saudi Arabia. Despite these tensions, Iran is cautious about escalating conflict due to its internal challenges with its Azeri population, limited military capacity, and economic constraints. Facing Azerbaijan's alliances with Turkey, a NATO member, and Israel, Iran's options are limited. While it may continue using groups like the Hüseynçilər to exert influence, these efforts have been largely unsuccessful.
- How do you assess the role of Iran in the current geopolitical situation in the Middle East, especially against the backdrop of escalating conflicts in the region?
- Iran has long relied on proxy groups, such as Hezbollah, to project its influence and challenge the stability of the Middle East, targeting U.S. interests and military bases, attacking rival countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and building "ring of fire" around Israel through grey-zone conflict. However, after October 7, Iran and its backed groups were quick to declare victory against Israel, as Israel's "Iron wall" was breached. But Netanyahu turned the tables, transforming this setback into an opportunity by striking at Iran's strongest card—Hezbollah, the group that had taken charge of the 'axis of resistance' more so than Iran's own Quds forces after the U.S. killed Qasem Soleimani in Iraq. Israel's goal to diminish the operational power of these groups, especially Hezbollah, brings the conflict closer to Iran's borders, a scenario Tehran has tried to avoid for decades. With its proxy forces weakened and its economy and political crisis, Iran is now more vulnerable, while regional countries may see this as a chance to curtail Iran's influence without escalating into a broader war.
- What do you think Iran's future strategy in relations with its main allies, such as Russia and China, will be in the context of ongoing sanctions and diplomatic isolation?
- Iran's future strategy with its main allies, Russia and China, will likely remain centered on shared opposition to the U.S.-led world order, driven by Tehran's ideological stance against the West. However, while Tehran sees these relationships as strategic, both Moscow and Beijing view Iran more as a tool to counter Western interests rather than a true strategic partner. This is evident in their support statement for the UAE's ownership claims against Iran's control islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs, signaling that their relations with Iran are based on pragmatic interests rather than deep alliances. Russia and China know that Iran, lacking alternative powerful allies, depends on them, unlike Arab states that can balance relationships with both Eastern and Western powers to their advantage. For instance, Saudi Arabia, which was relying solely on the U.S. for security and development, now engages with China and Russia, forcing the U.S. to be more accommodating to Saudi interests to counterbalance Beijing's and Moscow's influence. Thus, while Iran will continue to seek support from Russia and China, it will remain a junior partner with limited influence over their broader strategic calculations.
- How do you see the prospects for the Iranian nuclear program? Is it possible to return to negotiations with the international community or will Iran continue to insist on its positions?
- The prospects for the Iranian nuclear program are increasingly constrained, especially given Israel's intelligence capabilities, which have penetrated Iran's nuclear infrastructure—what I call the 'House of Glass.' Israel's visibility into Iran's nuclear activities means any significant move toward building a nuclear bomb would likely provoke a preemptive Israeli strike, with U.S. and Western collaborating in this attack. In this context, Iran is unlikely to risk such a move. However, returning to negotiations on the nuclear issue remains challenging for both sides. Iran's missile program and its involvement in supporting Russia's war in Europe complicate the situation, making diplomatic efforts difficult even to initiate, let alone succeed.
- What is the likelihood of an escalation of the conflict between Iran and Israel in the near future, given recent events and statements by both sides?
- The likelihood of an escalation between Iran and Israel is high, given Iran's second missile strike, in which a significant number of these missiles penetrated Israel's air defenses and put Israel in a position to justify a major retaliation with international backing. Tehran may have miscalculated by counting on U.S. restraint to prevent a broader conflict, but the current U.S. inability to hold Israel back suggests that a significant Israeli response is imminent. With Hezbollah weakened and Iran's missile strike option potentially compromised if Israel targets its missile bases and launchers, Tehran's ability to retaliate becomes increasingly limited. This precarious situation makes escalation more likely, as Israel is poised to take advantage of Iran's vulnerabilities.
