Iran is entering a period of heightened geopolitical tension and internal pressure, as it grapples with severe domestic crises and rapidly shifting regional dynamics. From the looming water shortage in Tehran to renewed speculation over potential negotiations with the United States, and from escalating tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan to Iran’s evolving role in the South Caucasus, the country is navigating multiple challenges simultaneously. In this context, The Caspian Post spoke with Georgian Iranologist Vasili Papava, who provided an in-depth assessment of Tehran’s strategic choices, the realism of its regional ambitions, and the prospects for diplomacy amid growing uncertainty.
- Recently, Ali Abdolalizadeh, the Iranian president’s representative for maritime resource management, stated that the issue of relocating the capital from Tehran has been removed from the agenda, and that a project has been developed to pump water from the Persian Gulf to address the city’s water shortages. In your opinion, how realistic are the government’s plans to solve Tehran’s drinking water deficit?
- The Iranian government’s plans to address Tehran’s acute drinking water shortage by pumping desalinated water from the Persian Gulf appear extremely unrealistic in the coming years, and nearly impossible as a solution to prevent the capital’s looming “Day Zero,” expected in 2025-2026.
The idea of completely relocating the capital, a proposal recently discussed seriously with cost estimates exceeding $100 billion, was officially shelved precisely because it proved even more expensive and complex than any pipeline project.
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Tehran is already on the brink of catastrophe: major reservoirs are only 8-13% full, water reserves may run out within weeks, and the city requires approximately 14 million cubic meters of water per day. The “Line of Hope” project, now promoted as the main solution, envisions desalination in the south and transporting water over a distance of 800-1,000 km with an elevation gain of more than one kilometer. According to Iranian hydrotechnical engineers, even with maximum acceleration, construction of such a pipeline to Tehran would take at least two to three years, and more likely five to seven.
The cost of water delivered this way would be $8-10 per cubic meter, 15-20 times higher than current prices. This makes the project economically impractical for mass public supply and viable only for specific industrial consumers. Energy demands are also enormous: lifting and pumping the water would require an additional 5,000-7,000 megawatts of electricity, which Iran already lacks.
Environmental consequences are also fueling protests: dumping hot brine into the Persian Gulf destroys marine life, and diverting large volumes of freshwater in the south to supply central Iran repeats the same mistakes that caused the drying of the Zayandeh Rud River and Lake Urmia.
In practice, the government is presenting a long-term, extremely expensive megaproject as a solution that, at best, could provide measurable water volumes to central Iran closer to 2030. For Tehran, it offers no help in the near term. Real relief lies in less glamorous but faster measures: strict reductions in agricultural consumption (90% of all water use in Iran), full modernization of urban water networks (which currently lose one-third of water), large-scale wastewater recycling, and strict rationing. Without these steps, any pipeline from the Gulf will merely be an extremely costly way to delay the inevitable.
- A source in Iran’s Foreign Ministry recently said that Iran would be ready for negotiations with the U.S. if Washington changed its approach. According to him, Tehran is interested in a compromise solution acceptable to all parties. A few days later, during a meeting with Crown Prince and Prime Minister of Saudi Arabia Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud, U.S. President Donald Trump said he was open to a possible deal with Iran. In your view, how likely is a compromise between the U.S. and Iran?
- The likelihood of a real compromise between the U.S. and Iran in the next 6-12 months remains extremely low.
What we are seeing now is a synchronized diplomatic performance: Trump publicly states that “Iran really wants a deal,” Iran’s Foreign Ministry replies that it is ready to talk “if the U.S. changes its hardline approach,” and Saudi Arabia positions itself as the main mediator. This resembles an attempt to reboot the spring Oman talks, which collapsed in June 2025 after Israeli-American strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities.
Source: Reuters
However, the fundamental obstacles remain unchanged. Trump still demands Iran completely abandon uranium enrichment and accept restrictions on ballistic missiles-conditions that Tehran views as surrender. Iran insists on the full and immediate lifting of all sanctions and legally binding non-interference guarantees, something Trump cannot offer without appearing weak to the Republican electorate and Israel.
Mutual trust is effectively zero: after the June bombings, Iran no longer believes any American promises, while Trump believes the strikes weakened Tehran and insists on maintaining pressure. But this strategy is ultimately futile.
Within Iran, reformist President Masoud Pezeshkian wants a deal to save the economy, but Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the IRGC firmly reject any major concessions. Saudi Arabia is genuinely interested in a deal to avoid a new war on its borders and prevent oil price spikes, but even its mediation cannot overcome these red lines.
Current signals are largely tactical probing, with each side attempting to shift responsibility for a potential conflict onto the other. Real negotiations could begin only under one of three conditions:
• Iran faces new internal protests or economic collapse,
• Trump decides he needs a foreign-policy victory, or
• another incident in the Strait of Hormuz forces both sides to engage.
None of these conditions has been met. Both sides remain entrenched. Despite the appealing rhetoric, this is a war of nerves. Under such circumstances, a real compromise in the foreseeable future is unlikely: each side believes any concession would be perceived as weakness.
- Iran’s Foreign Ministry has announced plans to hold a meeting in mid-December aimed at reconciling Afghanistan and Pakistan. How realistic is Tehran’s mediation mission in this process?
- Tehran’s mediation mission to reconcile Afghanistan and Pakistan appears quite realistic in the coming months, although fully resolving the conflict may take years.
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The Foreign Ministry’s announcement about a mid-December 2025 meeting is not mere diplomacy but part of an active campaign Iran has pursued since October. Deputy FM Saeed Khatibzadeh confirmed that Iran is organizing a regional forum with Afghanistan’s neighbors, including Russia and China, to ease tensions following the October border clashes, when Pakistani airstrikes on Afghan territory killed dozens, and the Taliban responded with artillery fire.
This is Iran’s fourth mediation attempt in two months: in late October, President Masoud Pezeshkian offered help to Pakistan’s interior minister; in November, Deputy FM Majid Takht-Ravanchi visited Islamabad for consultations; and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi publicly called for dialogue.
Tehran’s geographic position strengthens the initiative’s realism: sharing 900 km of border with both Afghanistan and Pakistan, Iran suffers directly from instability-from refugee flows (over 5 million Afghans in Iran) to terrorism threats from ISIS-Khorasan and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which use Afghan territory to launch attacks on Iranian provinces.
Pakistan has officially welcomed the proposal, calling Iran a “brotherly country” and expressing readiness for cooperation, seeing Iran as a neutral mediator after the failure of three Doha and Istanbul negotiation rounds led by Qatar and Türkiye. The Taliban also did not reject the idea; Taliban FM Muttaqi told Araghchi that regional stability is a priority, though he insists the TTP issue is “Pakistan’s internal matter.”
Prospects for success are strengthened by coordination with other players: Russia offered assistance, China supports mediation through the SCO, and Saudi Arabia is indirectly interested in de-escalation to protect its investments in Pakistan. The December meeting may achieve a breakthrough if it focuses on concrete steps, such as joint border patrols or intelligence-sharing mechanisms on the TTP, rather than abstract statements. Iran is also economically motivated: easing tensions would open a corridor for Chinese goods to transit through Afghanistan into Iran, boosting Tehran’s regional influence.
However, risks remain high. The Taliban deny harboring TTP and demand that Pakistan stop airstrikes, making compromise fragile. The November 6 clashes demonstrated how quickly the Doha ceasefire can collapse. Pakistan demands “irreversible” guarantees from Kabul, while its military pressures the government to stay tough after the recent Islamabad bombing (12 killed, attributed to TTP). Internal politics complicate matters: Taliban leaders view concessions as weakness; Pakistan’s military prefers escalation; Iran’s sanctions limit resources for long-term diplomacy. If the December meeting ends in declarations without verification mechanisms, it could repeat the failures of previous initiatives.
Ultimately, Iran is well-positioned to convene the meeting and achieve a temporary truce with Pakistan’s support, but lasting reconciliation requires a breakthrough in trust, which is currently lacking. This is an opportunity for Tehran to strengthen its regional leadership, but without pressure on the Taliban (via China or Russia) and concessions from Islamabad, the mission risks becoming another brief pause in escalation.
- At the end of October, Iran appointed new ambassadors to Armenia and Georgia, Khalil Shirgulami and Ali Modjani. Can we say that this change indicates a shift in Iran’s policy toward these countries?
- No, the appointment of new ambassadors to Armenia and Georgia, Khalil Shirgulami and Ali Modjani, at the end of October 2025 does not indicate a radical shift in Iran’s policy toward these states. This is likely a routine diplomatic rotation, typical of any state, where ambassadors change every 2-4 years depending on mission completion, internal appointments, or tactical adjustments.
However, it may signal subtle changes in emphasis, especially against the backdrop of growing regional turbulence in the South Caucasus, where Iran is increasing its presence to counterbalance the influence of Azerbaijan, Türkiye, and the West.
According to Iranian media (e.g., Tasnim News), Shirgulami was proposed as a successor to Mehdi Sobhani in Armenia back in September 2025, after Sobhani’s farewell meeting with Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. Sobhani, known for harsh rhetoric against Baku and active lobbying of the “Zangezur Corridor” as a threat to Iran, stepped down after three years, during which Iran positioned Armenia as its key partner for access to the Black Sea and Europe.
His replacement with Shirgulami, a diplomat with experience in Central Asia, seems intended to preserve continuity with the previous diplomatic line: the new ambassador has emphasized “historic ties” and joint projects like border infrastructure expansion (the second Araz River bridge) and the energy corridor. There are no signs of a policy shift; on the contrary, Iranian officials repeatedly underline Armenia’s strategic importance as a buffer against the Turkish-Azerbaijani alliance.
The situation in Georgia is similar: Ali Modjani was appointed after the previous ambassador’s term ended (Mahmoud Adib, since 2022). Relations between Iran and Georgia remain stable, focused on trade ($500 million in 2024) and Black Sea transit, with no abrupt changes. Tehran sees Tbilisi as an alternative route to bypass sanctions, especially after the June strikes on Iran, but the ambassadorial change is routine, not a policy overhaul.
At the August 2025 ambassadors’ conference, Armenian diplomats even discussed partnerships with Iran and Georgia as a priority, with no signs of discord.
These diplomatic appointments should be seen as part of Iran’s broader strategy in the South Caucasus. This foreign policy maneuver was inspired by the joint declaration of August 8, 2025, adopted within the U.S. peace initiative under the Trump administration. Iran’s main concern is the proposed “Trump Route” transit corridor through Armenia, which could marginalize Iran geopolitically by limiting its access to the Caucasus, Russia, and Europe, while strengthening the U.S.-Türkiye-Azerbaijan coalition.
Thus, until the new ambassadors propose concrete initiatives - whether within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization or in the energy sector - it is premature to speak of significant policy changes. For now, these appointments reflect Iran’s existing strategic course: maintaining Armenia as a buffer state to constrain the Turkish-Azerbaijani alliance.
By Asif Aydynly
