In recent years, rallies and demonstrations have become commonplace on the streets of Iranian cities. Public discontent has grown over clerical rule, military adventures, economic turmoil, and the sharp decline in living standards.
Inflation has reached 40 percent, while the national currency continues to depreciate at a staggering pace. Not long ago, one U.S. dollar was worth about 40,000 rials; today, it exceeds 1.4 million. Many shop owners are going bankrupt, purchasing power has fallen sharply, and the number of people living below the poverty line has reached critical levels.
Driven to desperation, Tehran bazaar merchants declared a strike on December 28, 2025, a particularly dangerous signal for the authorities. Historically, the bazaar played a key role in the overthrow of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in 1979. Today, history appears to be repeating itself. Perhaps this explains why calls to restore the Pahlavi dynasty are again being heard on the streets of Iranian cities.
In a multinational country such as Iran, Western-style democracy is widely viewed as unlikely to take root. To preserve national unity, many argue, a unifying symbol or ideology is required.
Source: The New York Times
The United States has already warned Iran’s leadership against the excessive use of force. Following the arrest of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro by special forces, speculation has intensified that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei may have few options remaining beyond relinquishing power. For now, however, the regime is attempting to divide protesters and attribute the crisis to foreign interference.
“A group of people hired by the enemy gathers behind the backs of merchants and shop owners and chants slogans against Islam, Iran, and the Islamic Republic,” Khamenei said. He added that “the rioters must be put in their place.” Many interpreted the remarks as a call for a harsh crackdown. In essence, however, Khamenei distinguished between “protesters” and “participants in disorder.”
He called for the punishment of certain activists while also urging the swift resolution of economic problems, shifting responsibility to the president and the government, which will now be expected to address them.
Source: Euronews
This represents a clear attempt to distance himself from responsibility for Iran’s economic troubles and shift the blame onto the government, which ultimately implements the will of the religious leadership. It was not President Masoud Pezeshkian who launched missile restoration programs, nor is he responsible for funding the Houthis and Hezbollah.
Against this backdrop, the president and his cabinet appear to be seeking the initiative. Pezeshkian has urged ministers to “listen to the legitimate demands” of protesters and stated that the government has plans to reform the monetary and banking system and preserve purchasing power.
He has also pointed to internal forces that benefit from “rents, smuggling, and bribery,” claiming they are obstructing reforms. He is widely understood to be referring to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and conservative rivals who may be hoping that the reformist president will fail to calm the unrest and can be made a scapegoat.
Such elite divisions, particularly during periods of upheaval, risk escalating unrest into a full-scale revolution. The current crisis appears to have no easy solution: the IRGC is unlikely to relinquish its privileges, leaving the regular army - so far silent - as a potential decisive factor.
Concerns are now growing over a possible civil war scenario. According to Mehr News Agency, “groups of armed people have taken to the streets of Ilam in western Iran,” while unrest has been reported in several provinces populated by ethnic and religious minorities.
Reports have also emerged that Khamenei has developed a contingency plan to flee Tehran if security forces fail to suppress the protests. The British newspaper The Times, citing intelligence sources, reported that the 86-year-old leader would leave the capital accompanied by family members and aides, including his son and heir Mojtaba Khamenei. Former Israeli intelligence officer Beni Sabti suggested that Moscow may be Khamenei’s destination, stating that “there is no other place for him.”
The report noted that Khamenei has appeared weakened since the 12-day war with Israel in June 2025 and has largely avoided public appearances during the recent unrest. If Iran’s leadership were to flee, the question of who would govern the country would immediately arise.
Judging by media reports, Reza Pahlavi, the heir to Iran’s former monarchy, is considered the most acceptable figure by the United States, Israel, and several other countries. However, any return to power would first require acceptance by the Iranian public. Analysts argue that the Islamic Republic’s economic and political failures have inadvertently revived the prestige of the Pahlavi dynasty. Over the decades of clerical rule, the regime has failed to ensure basic economic stability, curb corruption, or guarantee fundamental human rights, while at the same time demanding public loyalty in the wake of widespread executions of its opponents.
Source: Reuters
The Iranian opposition remains fragmented, often engaging in performative actions and frequent infighting, a dynamic that benefits the authorities. This disunity has allowed the Islamic Republic to survive more than one crisis. While the regime’s coercive apparatus may enable it to maintain control for some time, the current international environment and the growing willingness of external actors to intervene make prolonged stability increasingly unlikely.
Coercion remains effective only as long as it continues to work. Even limited breakdowns in obedience within the security forces could alter the regime’s ability to survive. Attention should therefore be focused not only on the protests themselves, but also on increasingly persistent signs that some units are struggling to maintain order and, in certain cases, may be quietly resisting the harshest directives. Each will ultimately act with an eye toward its own future.
It is in this context that Reza Pahlavi’s significance has grown, as he is widely seen as the only figure capable of uniting the regime’s opponents. This does not necessarily imply a desire to restore the monarchy in its former form. Rather, many Iranians appear to be seeking a point of reference - a recognizable name and face around which a vision of the country’s future can take shape. They are looking for a symbol of national continuity untainted by the clerical project of the Islamic Republic.
The current unrest in Iran has already been accompanied by monarchist slogans - a telling development. Societies do not revive calls for the return of monarchy unless they have, at some level, concluded that the existing order has become intolerable. Moreover, a future monarchy could be constitutional and fully modern, aligned with the interests of the broader nation.
